Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations
Chapter 801 - Civil procedure — commencement of action and venue.
801.05 - Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally.

801.05 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to s. 801.11 under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Local presence or status. In any action whether arising within or without this state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced:
(a) Is a natural person present within this state when served; or
(b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or
(c) Is a domestic corporation or limited liability company; or
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.
(2) Special jurisdiction statutes. In any action which may be brought under statutes of this state that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
(3) Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the defendant.
(4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the injury, either:
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade.
(5) Local services, goods or contracts. In any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or
(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this state if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or
(c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this state or to ship from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or
(d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on the defendant's order or direction; or
(e) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where delivery to carrier occurred.
(6) Local property. In any action which arises out of:
(a) A promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to create in either party an interest in, or protect, acquire, dispose of, use, rent, own, control or possess by either party real property situated in this state; or
(b) A claim to recover any benefit derived by the defendant through the use, ownership, control or possession by the defendant of tangible property situated within this state either at the time of the first use, ownership, control or possession or at the time the action is commenced; or
(c) A claim that the defendant return, restore, or account to the plaintiff for any asset or thing of value which was within this state at the time the defendant acquired possession or control over it.
(7) Deficiency judgment on local foreclosure or resale. In any action to recover a deficiency judgment upon a mortgage note or conditional sales contract or other security agreement executed by the defendant or predecessor to whose obligation the defendant has succeeded and the deficiency is claimed either:
(a) In an action in this state to foreclose upon real property situated in this state; or
(b) Following sale of real property in this state by the plaintiff under ch. 846; or
(c) Following resale of tangible property in this state by the plaintiff under ch. 409.
(8) Director, officer or manager of a domestic corporation or limited liability company. In any action against a defendant who is or was an officer, director or manager of a domestic corporation or domestic limited liability company where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer, director or manager or out of the activities of such corporation or limited liability company while the defendant held office as a director, officer or manager.
(9) Taxes or assessments. In any action for the collection of taxes or assessments levied, assessed or otherwise imposed by a taxing authority of this state after July 1, 1960.
(10) Insurance or insurers. In any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or some 3rd party by the defendant to insure upon or against the happening of an event and in addition either:
(a) The person insured was a resident of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred; or
(b) The event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred within this state, regardless of where the person insured resided.
(11) Certain marital actions. In addition to personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) and s. 801.06, in any action affecting the family, except for actions under ch. 769, in which a personal claim is asserted against the respondent commenced in the county in which the petitioner resides at the commencement of the action when the respondent resided in this state in marital relationship with the petitioner for not less than 6 consecutive months within the 6 years next preceding the commencement of the action and the respondent is served personally under s. 801.11. The effect of any determination of a child's custody shall not be binding personally against any parent or guardian unless the parent or guardian has been made personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court in the action as provided under this chapter or has been notified under s. 822.08 as provided in s. 822.06.
(11m) Certain restraining orders or injunctions.
(a) Subject to subch. II of ch. 822, and in addition to personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) and s. 801.06, in any action filed pursuant to s. 813.12, 813.122, 813.123, or 813.125, if any of the following apply:
1. Subject to par. (b), an act or threat of the respondent giving rise to the petition occurred outside the state and is part of an ongoing pattern of harassment that has an adverse effect on the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household, and the petitioner resides in this state.
2. Subject to par. (b), the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household has sought safety or protection in this state as a result of an act or threat of the respondent giving rise to the petition.
3. Personal jurisdiction is permissible under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wisconsin.
(b) Paragraph (a) 1. or 2. applies if, while the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household resides or is temporarily living in this state, the respondent has had direct or indirect communication with the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household or if the respondent has indicated a threat to the physical health or safety of the petitioner or of a member of the petitioner's family or household. A communication or indication for the purpose of this paragraph includes communication through mail, telephone, electronic message or transmittal, and posting on an electronic communication site, web page, or other electronic medium. Communication on any electronic medium that is generally available to any individual residing in this state is sufficient to exercise jurisdiction under par. (a) 1. or 2.
(c) If a court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to par. (a) and a respondent has been served but does not appear or does not file a response or motion asserting the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the court shall hear the action. This paragraph does not limit the respondent's right to challenge personal jurisdiction on appeal.
(12) Personal representative. In any action against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the deceased person represented where one or more of the grounds stated in subs. (2) to (11) would have furnished a basis for jurisdiction over the deceased had the deceased been living and it is immaterial under this subsection whether the action had been commenced during the lifetime of the deceased.
(13) Joinder of claims in the same action. In any action brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in subs. (2) to (11) there cannot be joined in the same action any other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds exist under this section for personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claim or cause to be joined.
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 592 (1975); 1975 c. 218; 1977 c. 105, 203, 418; 1979 c. 196; 1979 c. 352 s. 39; 1993 a. 112, 326, 486; 2005 a. 130; 2015 a. 4.
Jurisdiction over a foreign executor under sub. (12) cannot be based on substantial activities in Wisconsin under sub. (1) (d). Rauser v. Rauser, 47 Wis. 2d 295, 177 N.W.2d 115 (1970).
In an action against an Illinois corporate defendant and its officer alleging fraudulent advertising, the trial court possessed jurisdiction over the officer when the answer to the complaint admitted corporate advertising in newspapers circulated in Wisconsin, the contacting of Wisconsin residents responding to the advertisements, and the taking of earnest money deposits when testimony indicated that the defendant had participated in one such transaction in the state. State v. Advance Marketing Consultants, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 706, 225 N.W.2d 887 (1975).
Wisconsin courts may issue in personam orders that may operate on out-of-state property. Dalton v. Meister, 71 Wis. 2d 504, 239 N.W.2d 9 (1976).
The trial court was entitled to consider the complaint and answer in determining whether the court had jurisdiction. Merco Distributing Corp. v. O&R Engines, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 792, 239 N.W.2d 97 (1976).
A manufacturer having no dealers or distributors in Wisconsin was amenable to jurisdiction under sub. (4) by virtue of magazine advertisement solicitations and out-of-state sales to Wisconsin residents. Fields v. Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc., 75 Wis. 2d 644, 250 N.W.2d 311 (1977).
Findings of the facts requisite for jurisdiction under sub. (4) (b) may properly be made by reasonable inference from facts proven in the record. Stevens v. White Motor Corp., 77 Wis. 2d 64, 252 N.W.2d 88 (1977).
Standards of the “long-arm" statute prima facie meet due process requirements. Schmitz v. Hunter Machinery Co., 89 Wis. 2d 388, 279 N.W.2d 172 (1979).
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction under this section. Lincoln v. Seawright, 104 Wis. 2d 4, 310 N.W.2d 596 (1981).
Substantially higher “doing business" contacts under sub. (1) (d) are required when a nonresident plaintiff brings a foreign cause of action. Vermont Yogurt v. Blanke Baer Fruit & Flavor, 107 Wis. 2d 603, 321 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1982).
Sub. (11) provides three independent sources of personal jurisdiction that must be considered in the disjunctive. McAleavy v. McAleavy, 150 Wis. 2d 26, 440 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
Telephone calls received by a defendant do not, standing alone, constitute sufficient contact to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction. Dietrich v. Patients Compensation Board, 169 Wis. 2d 471, 485 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1992).
A non-resident corporate officer alleged to have committed fraud or misrepresentation is subject to Wisconsin jurisdiction only if some act or omission was committed in Wisconsin. Pavlic v. Woodrum, 169 Wis. 2d 585, 486 N.W.2d 533, (Ct. App. 1992).
The term “service activities" under sub. (4) (a) requires that a defendant be engaged in some type of regular ongoing or repetitive activities in Wisconsin. Two meetings does not constitute service activities carried on within the state. Housing Horizons, LLC v. Alexander Company, Inc., 2000 WI App 9, 232 Wis. 2d 178, 606 N.W.2d 263, 98-3635.
“Process" in sub. (4) (b) means subjecting something to a particular system of handling to effect a particular result and preparing something for market or other commercial use by subjecting it to a process. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, 245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662, 99-3144.
A stream of commerce theory that it is not unreasonable to subject a nonresident manufacturer or distributor to suit if the sale of a product is not simply an isolated occurrence but arises from efforts to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for the product in the state, is applicable in determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist for jurisdiction to be found. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, 245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662, 99-3144.
Every personal jurisdiction issue requires a two-step inquiry. It must first be determined whether defendants are subject to jurisdiction under Wisconsin's long-arm statute. If the statutory requirements are satisfied, then the court must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process requirements. Kopke v. A. Hardtrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, 245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662, 99-3144.
Sub. (1) (d) may be a basis for personal jurisdiction over a respondent in a divorce and is not restricted to business or employment related activities. Bushelman v. Bushelman, 2001 WI App 124, 246 Wis. 2d 317, 629 N.W.2d 795, 00-0670.
The presumption of compliance with due process arising from this section may be rebutted by a defendant. There is a five-factor test to analyze the substantiality of the defendant's contacts for due process purposes: the quantity, nature, and quality of the contacts, the source of the cause of action and its connection with those contacts, the interest of the state in the action, and convenience to the parties. Bushelman v. Bushelman, 2001 WI App 124, 246 Wis. 2d 317, 629 N.W.2d 795, 00-0670.
If a person is induced by false representations to come within the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of obtaining service of process upon him or her, it is an abuse of legal process, and the service will be set aside. Service on a person who enters the state to engage in settlement talks will not be set aside in the absence of an agreement that service will not be attempted. Manitowoc Western Company, Inc. v. Montonen, 2002 WI 21, 250 Wis. 2d 452, 639 N.W.2d 726, 00-0420.
Traditional personal jurisdiction is not required in child custody proceedings. Child custody proceedings under ch. 822 are valid even in the absence of minimum contacts over an out-of-state parent. Sub. (11) provides sufficient due process protection to out-of-state parents based on notice and an opportunity to be heard. Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., 2003 WI 61, 262 Wis. 2d 217, 663 N.W.2d 734, 01-2787.
In analyzing the quality of a defendant's contacts within the state, personal visits are the highest quality of contact. The next highest quality of contact is personal contact of another type. Druschel v. Cloeren, 2006 WI App 190, 295 Wis. 2d 858, 723 N.W. 2d 430, 05-2575.
Minimum contacts require the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he or she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The concept that the contacts of an individual, made as an agent of a business, do not count toward the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction, commonly referred to as the fiduciary shield doctrine, has not been adopted in Wisconsin. Druschel v. Cloeren, 2006 WI App 190, 295 Wis. 2d 858, 723 N.W. 2d 430, 05-2575.
The constitutional touchstone of long-arm jurisdiction is whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. If the defendant's efforts are purposefully directed toward another state's resident, jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because he or she did not physically enter the forum state. A substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, making physical presence unnecessary. Stayart v. Hance, 2007 WI App 204, 747 N.W. 2d 149, 06-1418.
Sub. (1) (d) plainly requires the circuit court to analyze a defendant's contacts at the time the action is commenced. It was error for the circuit court to analyze the defendant's contacts preceding the commencement of the action. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.
Courts consider five factors when analyzing whether a defendant has substantial contacts under sub. (1) (d): 1) the quantity of the contacts; 2) the quality of the contacts; 3) the source of the contacts and their connection with the cause of action; 4) the state's interest; and 5) the convenience of the parties. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.
To determine whether an action relates to goods shipped from this state in a breach of contract action under sub. (5) (d), the court analyzes the contract's provisions and the complaint's allegations. Jurisdiction was not appropriate under sub. (5) (d) in this case because the action did not relate to the equipment the plaintiff provided the defendant. This case involved an employment contract, and not a sales contract, that made only one passing reference to equipment and lacked provisions traditionally included in sales contracts. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.
Absent control by a parent corporation sufficient to cause a court to disregard the separate corporate identities of the parent and a subsidiary corporation, the activities of the subsidiary are insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation to general personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) (d). In assessing corporate separateness, Wisconsin courts have focused most directly on the amount of control that one corporation exercises or has the right to exercise over the other; whether both corporations employ independent decision-making; whether corporate formalities are observed; whether the corporations operate as one corporation; and whether observing the corporate separateness facilitates fraud. Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623, 07-0035.
The meaning of “to the defendant" in sub. (5) (d) includes shipping goods from Wisconsin to third parties at the defendant's order or direction. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.
Two questions govern whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process: 1) whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in Wisconsin; and 2) if so, whether the defendant's contacts in Wisconsin comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice, in light of relevant factors. The plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing that the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the state, and, if so, the burden then shifts to that the defendant to present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.
To make the determination of fair play and substantial justice under the due process analysis, the court considers five factors: 1) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 2) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 3) the burden on the defendant; 4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and 5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. When there is a strong showing that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Wisconsin law, a lower showing of fairness suffices to permit personal jurisdiction. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.
The defendant did not purposefully establish minimum contacts in Wisconsin so as to permit the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it under the facts of this case. Defendant's advertisements on its own website and third-party sites represented merely potential contacts with the state of Wisconsin. The facts did not suggest that the defendant targeted Wisconsin residents with its Internet advertisements any more than any other state's residents and the advertisements were accessible to everyone regardless of location. Carlson v. Fidelity Motor Group, LLC, 2015 WI App 16, 360 Wis. 2d 369, 860 N.W.2d 299, 14-0695.
An article published online is “processed" within the meaning of sub. (4) (b). The broad definition of “process" adopted by the supreme court in Kopke, 2001 WI 99, is broad enough to embrace the newspaper's process of preparing and arranging news and blank spaces for advertising content for the market and subjecting it to information processing so that users in Wisconsin can access articles placed on its website. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.
The relationship between the defendant and the forum state must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself or herself creates with the forum state. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused minimum contacts inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum state. The minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.
A Wisconsin court may not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose only real connection to Wisconsin is in having published an article online that is ostensibly available to anyone in the world and that also provides for targeted advertising based upon the user's location and interests. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.
A father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over the father in California courts. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).
A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking a contractual obligation of the defendant's insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 571, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980).
When an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on the Minnesota courts and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981).
Foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation are not amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 7, 131 S. Ct. 858, 178 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2011).
The 14th amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Because a state court's assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state's coercive power, it is subject to review for compatibility with the 14th amendment's due process clause, which limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant's general connections with the forum are not enough. A specific connection between the forum and specific claims at issue is required. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017).
When an out-of-state defendant placed an order in Wisconsin, but conducted no other activities in the state, the minimum contacts test was not satisfied. Lakeside Bridge & Steel v. Mountain State Const. 597 F.2d 596 (1979).
A New York corporation was subject to the long-arm statute when agents of the corporation made two visits to the state in connection with business on which the claim was based. Wisconsin Electrical Manufacturing Co. v. Pennant Products, 619 F.2d 676 (1980).
The Wisconsin circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over trust assets in Illinois, making removal to Wisconsin federal district court improper. Norton v. Bridges, 712 F.2d 1156 (1983).
“Processed" under sub. (4) (b) included a distributor's purchase and sale of goods in the normal course of distribution of those goods. Nelson By Carson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (1983).
A buyer's inspection of goods before shipment from the state was sufficient contact for jurisdiction. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (1985).
An act or omission occurring outside the state with consequences in the state does not fit the tort provisions of sub. (3). Services within the state under sub. (5) do not include the purchase of insurance from a state company. Federated Rural Electric Ins. v. Inland Power & Light, 18 F.3d 389 (1994).
Specific personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant's contacts with the forum state show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed the defendant's activities at the state. This analysis focuses on the defendant's contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there. Deliberate contact with the resident of a state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state itself. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Hotai Insurance Co., 938 F.3d 874 (2019).
Jurisdiction in an action for misrepresentation in the sale of a boat did not exist when the only contact was that the boat would be operated partly in Wisconsin and that the seller wrote a letter to the Wisconsin buyer confirming the already existing contract. McCalla v. A.J. Industries, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 544 (1973).
The fact that a Virginia corporation was a distributor for a Wisconsin corporation in Virginia is not enough to justify an action in Wisconsin. Watral v. Murphy Diesel Co., 358 F. Supp. 968 (1973).
A Texas company that ordered a turbine from a Wisconsin manufacturer and sent representatives to Wisconsin twice was subject to Wisconsin jurisdiction. Nordberg Division, Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Hudson Engineering Corp., 361 F. Supp. 903 (1973).
An action for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while using a machine manufactured by the defendant in France and sold to the plaintiff's employer was an action for personal injury based on breach of warranty and strict liability under subs. (4) and (5) (c). Davis v. Mercier-Freres, 368 F. Supp. 498 (1973).
Service upon a nonresident defendant's father at the father's residence was insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident, despite claimed actual notice, when no attempt was made to comply with s. 345.09. Chilcote v. Shertzer, 372 F. Supp. 86 (1974).
The court had jurisdiction over an insurer under sub. (1) (d) based on settlement negotiations conducted by an adjuster, and the insurer was estopped from asserting its no-action clause. Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313 (1975).
The court had in-personam jurisdiction by virtue of sub. (5) (b) and (e) when the defendant made initial contact with the plaintiff, sent its president to Milwaukee to solicit the plaintiff's participation in the transaction, delivered documentation of title to the subject property to the plaintiff in Milwaukee, accepted payment in Milwaukee, and executed a lease agreement in Milwaukee. Ridge Leasing Corp. v. Monarch Royalty, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 573 (1975).
To determine whether a particular nonresident is “doing business" within this state, the court must consider the party's overall activities within the state, past and present, not at some fixed point in time. Modern Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Burkhardt-Larson Co., 395 F. Supp. 587 (1975).
Actions of out-of-state police officials in continuously soliciting the plaintiff's arrest by a “fugitive from justice notice" entered into an FBI computer data base, representing to Wisconsin authorities that extradition was desired and requesting that the plaintiff be arrested was sufficient minimum contact with Wisconsin to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (1975).
Infrequent use of Wisconsin roads by an Idaho trucking corporation did not constitute “continuous and systematic" activity necessary to confer jurisdiction under this section. Ladwig v. Trucks Ins. Exch., 498 F. Supp. 161 (1980).
A foreign corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in Wisconsin when the sole basis for assertion of jurisdiction was unilateral activity of the resident plaintiff. Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 508 F. Supp. 879 (1981).
In applying the test under sub. (1) (d), the court looks to the defendant's general contacts with the forum state, not merely its contacts arising out of the specific transaction at issue. Jadair v. Van Lott, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1141 (1981).
The defendant's attorney's delivery of checks in the state was insufficient contact to confer jurisdiction under this section. Sed, Inc. v. Bohager/Goodhues, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 196 (1982).
Contracts for services and contracts for goods are distinguished. L.B. Sales Corp. v. Dial Manufacturing, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 290 (1984).
A single sale in the state was insufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction. Uni-Bond, LTD. v. Schultz, 607 F. Supp. 1361 (1985).
A parent-subsidiary relationship is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the parent for long-arm purposes so long as the subsidiary carries on sufficient activities in the state. Hayeland v. Jaques, 847 F. Supp 630 (1994).
This section is intended to reach to the fullest extent allowed under the due process clause. Farby Glove & Mitten Co. v. Spitzer, 908 F. Supp. 625 (1995).
Foreseeability that the defendant's actions in one state may cause injury in Wisconsin does not amount to causing a local act. The consequences of an act alone do not establish jurisdiction over the defendant under sub. (3). Nelson v. Bulso, 979 F. Supp 1239 (1997).
In order for solicitation activities to trigger personal jurisdiction the solicitor must anticipate receiving a financial benefit from the activity. Knot Just Beads v. Knot Just Beads, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 932 (2002).
The fiduciary shield doctrine, which denies personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in a state were solely on behalf of an employer or other principal, was not found to be a part of Wisconsin law. Norkol/Fibercore, Inc. v. Gubb, 279 F. Supp. 2d 993 (2003).
The state may not assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over an insurance company's contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured. 64 MLR 374 (1980).
Stacking the deck: Wisconsin's application of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations to torts choice-of-law cases. White. 1985 WLR 401.
Wisconsin's `Stream of Commerce' Theory of Personal Jurisdiction. La Fave. Wis. Law. Nov. 2002.

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