Connecticut General Statutes
Chapter 124 - Zoning
Section 8-8. - Appeal from board to court. Mediation. Review by Appellate Court.

(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Aggrieved person” means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, “aggrieved person” includes any person owning land in this state that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.
(2) “Board” means a municipal zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission, zoning board of appeals or other board or commission the decision of which may be appealed pursuant to this section, or the chief elected official of a municipality, or such official's designee, in a hearing held pursuant to section 22a-250, whose decision may be appealed.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c), (d) and (r) of this section and sections 7-147 and 7-147i, any person aggrieved by any decision of a board, including a decision to approve or deny a site plan pursuant to subsection (g) of section 8-3 or a special permit or special exception pursuant to section 8-3c, may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located, notwithstanding any right to appeal to a municipal zoning board of appeals under section 8-6. The appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (f) and (g) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes. The appeal shall be returned to court in the same manner and within the same period of time as prescribed for civil actions brought to that court.
(c) In those situations where the approval of a planning commission must be inferred because of the failure of the commission to act on an application, any aggrieved person may appeal under this section. The appeal shall be taken within twenty days after the expiration of the period prescribed in section 8-26d for action by the commission.
(d) Any person affected by an action of a planning commission taken under section 8-29 may appeal under this section. The appeal shall be taken within thirty days after notice to such person of the adoption of a survey, map or plan or the assessment of benefits or damages.
(e) The proceedings of the court for an appeal may be stayed by agreement of the parties when a mediation conducted pursuant to section 8-8a commences, provided any such stay shall terminate upon termination of the mediation.
(f) Service of legal process for an appeal under this section shall be directed to a proper officer and shall be made as follows:
(1) For any appeal taken before October 1, 2004, process shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of the process with, or at the usual place of abode of, the chairman or clerk of the board, and by leaving a true and attested copy with the clerk of the municipality. Service on the chairman or clerk of the board and on the clerk of the municipality shall be for the purpose of providing legal notice of the appeal to the board and shall not thereby make the chairman or clerk of the board or the clerk of the municipality a necessary party to the appeal.
(2) For any appeal taken on or after October 1, 2004, process shall be served in accordance with subdivision (5) of subsection (b) of section 52-57. Such service shall be for the purpose of providing legal notice of the appeal to the board and shall not thereby make the clerk of the municipality or the chairman or clerk of the board a necessary party to the appeal.
(g) Service of process shall also be made on each person who petitioned the board in the proceeding, provided such person's legal rights, duties or privileges were determined therein. However, failure to make service within fifteen days on parties other than the board shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal. If service is not made within fifteen days on a party in the proceeding before the board, the court, on motion of the party or the appellant, shall make such orders of notice of the appeal as are reasonably calculated to notify the party not yet served. If the failure to make service causes prejudice to the board or any party, the court, after hearing, may dismiss the appeal or may make such other orders as are necessary to protect the party prejudiced.
(h) The appeal shall state the reasons on which it has been predicated and shall not stay proceedings on the decision appealed from. However, the court to which the appeal is returnable may grant a restraining order, on application, and after notice to the board and cause shown.
(i) Within thirty days after the return date to court, or within any further time the court allows, the board shall transmit the record to the court. The record shall include, without limitation, (1) the original papers acted on by the board and appealed from, or certified copies thereof, (2) a copy of the transcript of the stenographic or sound recording prepared in accordance with section 8-7a, and (3) the written decision of the board including the reasons therefor and a statement of any conditions imposed. If the board does not provide a transcript of the stenographic or the sound recording of a meeting where the board deliberates or makes a decision on a petition, application or request on which a public hearing was held, a certified, true and accurate transcript of a stenographic or sound recording of the meeting prepared by or on behalf of the applicant or any other party shall be admissible as part of the record. By stipulation of all parties to the appeal, the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for additional costs. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record.
(j) Any defendant may, at any time after the return date of the appeal, make a motion to dismiss the appeal. If the basis of the motion is a claim that the appellant lacks standing to appeal, the appellant shall have the burden of proving standing. The court may, on the record, grant or deny the motion. The court's order on the motion may be appealed in the manner provided in subsection (o) of this section.
(k) The court shall review the proceedings of the board and shall allow any party to introduce evidence in addition to the contents of the record if (1) the record does not contain a complete transcript of the entire proceedings before the board, including all evidence presented to it, pursuant to section 8-7a, or (2) it appears to the court that additional testimony is necessary for the equitable disposition of the appeal. The court may take the evidence or may appoint a referee or committee to take such evidence as it directs and report the same to the court, with any findings of facts and conclusions of law. Any report of a referee, committee or mediator under subsection (f) of section 8-8a shall constitute a part of the proceedings on which the determination of the court shall be made.
(l) The court, after a hearing thereon, may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may revise, modify or remand the decision from which the appeal was taken in a manner consistent with the evidence in the record before it. In an appeal from an action of a planning commission taken under section 8-29, the court may also reassess any damages or benefits awarded by the commission. Costs shall be allowed against the board if the decision appealed from is reversed, affirmed in part, modified or revised.
(m) Appeals from decisions of the board shall be privileged cases and shall be heard as soon as is practicable unless cause is shown to the contrary.
(n) No appeal taken under subsection (b) of this section shall be withdrawn and no settlement between the parties to any such appeal shall be effective unless and until a hearing has been held before the Superior Court and such court has approved such proposed withdrawal or settlement.
(o) There shall be no right to further review except to the Appellate Court by certification for review, on the vote of three judges of the Appellate Court so to certify and under such other rules as the judges of the Appellate Court establish. The procedure on appeal to the Appellate Court shall, except as otherwise provided herein, be in accordance with the procedures provided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments rendered by the Superior Court unless modified by rule of the judges of the Appellate Court.
(p) The right of a person to appeal a decision of a board to the Superior Court and the procedure prescribed in this section shall be liberally interpreted in any case where a strict adherence to these provisions would work surprise or injustice. The appeal shall be considered to be a civil action and, except as otherwise required by this section or the rules of the Superior Court, pleadings may be filed, amended or corrected, and parties may be summoned, substituted or otherwise joined, as provided by the general statutes.
(q) If any appeal has failed to be heard on its merits because of insufficient service or return of the legal process due to unavoidable accident or the default or neglect of the officer to whom it was committed, or the appeal has been otherwise avoided for any matter of form, the appellant shall be allowed an additional fifteen days from determination of that defect to properly take the appeal. The provisions of section 52-592 shall not apply to appeals taken under this section.
(r) In any case in which a board fails to comply with a requirement of a general or special law, ordinance or regulation governing the content, giving, mailing, publishing, filing or recording of any notice either of a hearing or of an action taken by the board, any appeal or action by an aggrieved person to set aside the decision or action taken by the board on the grounds of such noncompliance shall be taken not more than one year after the date of that decision or action.
(1949 Rev., S. 844; 1951, 1955, S. 379d; 1959, P.A. 460, S. 2; 1963, P.A. 45; February, 1965, P.A. 622, S. 3; 1967, P.A. 348; 712; 1971, P.A. 870, S. 9; P.A. 74-183, S. 179, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 158, 681; P.A. 77-470; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 81-165; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 13, 82; P.A. 84-227, S. 1; P.A. 85-284, S. 3; P.A. 86-236, S. 2; P.A. 88-79, S. 1, 4; P.A. 89-356, S. 1; P.A. 90-286, S. 1, 2, 9; P.A. 91-219; P.A. 92-249, S. 8; P.A. 99-238, S. 5, 8; P.A. 00-84, S. 3, 6; 00-108, S. 2; P.A. 01-47, S. 1; 01-110; 01-195, S. 112, 181; P.A. 02-74, S. 2; P.A. 04-78, S. 1; P.A. 07-60, S. 1; P.A. 12-146, S. 1; P.A. 15-85, S. 2; P.A. 19-64, S. 24.)
History: 1959 act deleted qualification in sentence re taking of evidence in addition to record “if said record does not contain a stenographic report or a complete mechanical recording of the entire proceedings before said board including all evidence presented to it”; 1963 act added to the same sentence “if the record does not contain a complete transcript of the entire proceedings before said board, including all evidence presented to it, pursuant to section 8-7a”; 1965 act provided 15 days allowed for taking appeal run from date decision was published rather than from date it was rendered; 1967 acts allowed costs against board if decision “reversed, affirmed in part, modified or revised” rather than allowing costs only when court decides board acted with gross negligence, in bad faith or with malice as previously and allowed appeals by persons owning land adjacent to land involved in decision; 1971 act added provisions concerning appeals to supreme court; P.A. 74-183 included judicial districts; P.A. 76-436 substituted superior court for court of common pleas, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-470 allowed appeals by persons whose land is within one-hundred-foot radius of land involved in decision; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 81-165 allowed for service of notice upon the clerk of the municipality; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to supreme court and substituted appellate court in lieu thereof; P.A. 84-227 inserted Subsec. indicators, added Subsec. (d) re a hearing on a motion to dismiss made by the person who applied for the board's decision where each appellant has the burden of proving his standing to bring the appeal, and added Subsec. (h) prohibiting withdrawal or settlement without court approval; P.A. 85-284 provided for notice of appeals to be given to the chairman or clerk of the board and the clerk of the municipality, rather than just one; P.A. 86-236 amended Subsec. (c) to require the return of the transcript of the stenographic or sound recording; P.A. 88-79 amended Subsec. (b) to add proviso that service of the notice of the appeal upon the clerk of the municipality is for the purpose of providing additional notice of such appeal to the board and does not thereby make such clerk a necessary party to such appeal; P.A. 89-356 entirely reorganized existing provisions and added Subsec. (a) defining “aggrieved person” and “board”, added Subsec. (c) re the procedure for taking an appeal where the approval of the planning commission must be inferred, formerly part of Sec. 8-28, added Subsec. (d) re the procedure for taking an appeal by a person affected by an action of a planning commission under Sec. 8-29, formerly part of Sec. 8-30, added Subsec. (f) re service of process on parties other than the board and the consequences and court remedies if such service is not made, added provisions in Subsec. (i) requiring the record to include the board's findings of fact and conclusions of law, authorizing the record to be shortened by stipulation and additional costs to be taxed against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to limit the record and authorizing the court to require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record, added provisions in Subsec. (l) authorizing the court in sustaining an appeal to render a judgment that modifies the board decision or orders the particular board action if a particular board action is required by law and authorizing the court in an appeal from an action of a planning commission taken under Sec. 8-29 to reassess damages or benefits awarded by the commission, formerly part of Sec. 8-30, added Subsec. (p) providing for a liberal interpretation of the right to appeal and the appeal procedure and providing that an appeal shall be considered a civil action, and added Subsec. (q) allowing an appellant additional time to take the appeal if the appeal has failed to be heard on its merits because of certain defects and providing that Sec. 52-592 shall not apply to appeals taken under this section; P.A. 90-286 amended Subsec. (b) to replace “The appeal shall be taken” with “The appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (e) and (f) of this section” and to replace “The appeal shall be commenced and returned to court in the same manner as prescribed for civil actions brought to that court” with “The appeal shall be returned to court in the same manner and within the same period of time as prescribed for civil actions brought to that court” and amended Subsec. (i) to replace requirement that the board transmit the record within 30 days “after the appeal is served” with within 30 days “after the return date to court”; P.A. 91-219 amended Subsec. (i) to require that the record include the written decision of the board rather than the board's findings of fact and conclusions of law; P.A. 92-249 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to include the chief elected official of a municipality in the definition of “board” re hearings under Sec. 22a-250; P.A. 99-238 amended Subsec. (b) by adding reference to new Subsec. (r), and added new Subsec. (r) re appeal of aggrieved person to set aside decision or action of board for noncompliance with requirement of notice of content, giving, mailing, publishing, filing or recording of hearing or action taken by board within two years of the date of such decision or action, effective July 1, 2000; P.A. 00-84 revised effective date of P.A. 99-238 to specify applicability of section as amended by that act to errors, irregularities and omissions occurring on or after January 1, 1999, effective July 1, 2000; P.A. 00-108 deleted former Subsec. (h) re surety bond, relettered the subsections accordingly and amended new Subsec. (h) to add provision re transcripts of meetings; P.A. 01-47 inserted new Subsec. (e) re mediation, redesignated existing Subsecs. (e) to (q) as Subsecs. (f) to (r) and made technical and conforming changes; P.A. 01-110 amended former Subsec. (q) by reducing the time for appeal from within two years to not more than one year; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes, effective July 11, 2001 (Revisor's note: In merging the gender-neutral technical changes to Subsec. (a)(2) contained in P.A. 01-47 and P.A. 01-195, the Revisors gave precedence to the changes contained in P.A. 01-195); P.A. 02-74 amended Subsec. (b) to allow appeals of decisions to approve or deny site plans under Sec. 8-3(g), effective June 3, 2002; P.A. 04-78 amended Subsec. (f) by designating existing service requirements as Subdiv. (1), applicable to appeals taken before October 1, 2004, adding Subdiv. (2) re service requirements applicable to appeals taken on or after said date and making conforming changes; P.A. 07-60 amended Subsec. (b) to authorize appeal of special permits and special exceptions and add provision notwithstanding right to appeal under Sec. 8-6; P.A. 12-146 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding “in this state” re land abutting or within 100 feet of land involved in board decision; P.A. 15-85 amended Subsec. (l) by replacing provisions re modification or revision of decision appealed from with provision authorizing court to revise, modify or remand the decision from which appeal was taken in a manner consistent with the evidence in the record before it; P.A. 19-64 amended Subsec. (o) by replacing “vote of two judges” with “vote of three judges”.
Right of appeal under section is from decision of zoning board of appeals under zoning laws contained in chapter and does not extend to decisions of board under another statute. 116 C. 555. Power of court to modify or revise does not include power to substitute its own discretion for that of board; must find that board acted illegally or abused discretion. 120 C. 455. Cited. 123 C. 263. Appeal from zoning board is not an action within meaning of Sec. 54-131 which permits a new action when writ abated. 126 C. 603. Under same language in New Haven charter, right of appeal held not to be contingent upon restraining order; no vested right acquired by applicant by virtue of fact no such order was obtained when opponent appealed. 127 C. 309. Recognizance without surety is insufficient; failure to file bond sound ground for abatement of appeal. 131 C. 657. No appeal from zoning commission under former statutes. 133 C. 248. Cited. 135 C. 305. Reasons for decision and transcript of evidence both constitute “proceedings” before board. 136 C. 1. Finding should contain only facts which court finds on basis of evidence taken by it. Id., 452. Cited. 138 C. 500. Plaintiff held an aggrieved person. 139 C. 463. Competitors are not aggrieved persons but owners of residential property in vicinity are. Id., 577. “Any person aggrieved” includes any landowner or resident within city whose situation is such that decision may adversely affect him in use or occupancy of his property. 140 C. 65. Prayer for relief to effect that decision of board of zoning appeals be modified or reversed is not necessary. 142 C. 277. Cited. Id., 415; Id., 659; 143 C. 280; 144 C. 61. If sole basis of plaintiff's grievance was that new business would create competition, he would not be an aggrieved person; any taxpayer of a town who feels aggrieved at granting of license for sale of liquors therein has right of appeal. Id., 160. On an appeal from zoning board of appeals, record made before board should be annexed to, and incorporated by reference in, answer of board; where there is an incompleteness in summary of evidence, court must take evidence to determine what facts and considerations were presumptively in minds of members of board when they acted. Id., 332. Cited. Id., 425, 493. Admissibility of evidence outside of record; wide and liberal discretion in board. Id., 560. Finding that plaintiff is not an aggrieved person divests court of jurisdiction. 145 C. 136. Admissibility of evidence not on record and of evidence not presented at hearing. Id., 218. Change in comprehensive plan, though not change in zone itself, may adversely affect parties outside immediate vicinity. Id., 237. Cited. Id., 325, 416, 435. Considerations authorizing variance are not identical with those justifying an outright change of zone. Id., 468. Zoning commission cannot appeal unless ruling or order of its own is in issue. Id., 655. To be an aggrieved person, where traffic in intoxicating liquor is not involved, one must be found to have been specially and injuriously affected in his property or other legal rights. Id.; 149 C. 284. On appeal, court cannot conduct a trial de novo and substitute its findings and conclusions for decision of board. 146 C. 27. Denial of motion to present evidence in addition to record held indicative that additional testimony was not necessary for equitable disposition of appeal. Id., 547. When building met zoning requirements, building inspector exceeded his authority in imposing additional conditions for certificate of occupancy. Id., 570. Scope of authority of committee appointed to take evidence. Id., 588. Action of board held an abuse of discretion since facts did not warrant granting of variance. Id., 595. Aggrievement from which one may appeal does not arise until board has acted. Id., 665. Former statute: On appeal, admission of testimony not presented to commission is within discretion of court; evidence of former applications admissible only when subsequent application seeks substantially same relief. 147 C. 65. Limits of court's power in reviewing refusal of board to grant variance. Id., 469. Cited. 148 C. 33, 299. Plaintiff's property bordered defendant's land which had received a zoning variance; plaintiff held to be an aggrieved person. Id., 492. Inferentially requires stenographic transcript or mechanical recording to be filed with court with return of board's proceedings. Id., 599. Inadequate summary required trial court to hear evidence. Id., 600. Evidence to prove plaintiff aggrieved admissible. Id., 602. One cannot qualify as aggrieved person solely because zone change may permit operation of business in competition with him. 149 C. 284. Motion for permission to offer additional evidence on appeal called for decision, in exercise of court's discretion, as to whether additional evidence was necessary for equitable disposition of appeal. Id., 413; 150 C. 285. Where court does not hear evidence, but decides appeal on record returned by zoning commission, no finding should be made. 149 C. 414. Cited. Id., 681. Plaintiffs were aggrieved persons within meaning of statute if board's decision affected them directly or in relation to a specific, personal interest, as distinguished from a general interest, in the subject matter. Id., 698. Although plaintiff could not, in its appeal from denial of permit, attack constitutionality of regulations under which it sought permit, it could attack their constitutionality in an independent proceeding. Id., 712. Under New Haven charter, person aggrieved by decision of zoning enforcement officer may appeal to board of zoning appeals which shall hear and determine reasonableness of decision; in such case, function of court on appeal from board of appeals is to decide whether board correctly interpreted ordinance and applied it with reasonable discretion to facts. 150 C. 113. Plaintiff has burden of proving that it is aggrieved; this burden requires that it establish that it was specially and injuriously affected in its property rights or other legal rights; it is not sufficient to show that action complained of would permit the operation of business in competition with its business. Id., 285. History discussed; reversal of decision in 23 CS 6; failure of board of appeals to comply with mandate of Sec. 8-7a renders action voidable at option of an aggrieved person. Id., 411. Party claiming aggrievement must show he is specifically and injuriously affected, mere generalities and fears are not enough. Id., 696. Right of appeal begins to run from effective date of decision which is controlled by Sec. 8-7. 151 C. 378. Cited. Id., 510; 646. Time for taking appeal from zoning board controlled by Sec. 8-7 rather than this section. Id., 646. Although applicant has burden of proving board acted in abuse of its discretion, board must show justification on record for denial of variance. 152 C. 247. Building inspector is authorized to take appeal from board's action in granting variance since he is “charged with the enforcement” of the decision of the board. Id., 311. Cited. Id., 660, 661. To be an “aggrieved” person, in a case in which traffic in intoxicating liquor is not involved, one has to be specially and injuriously affected in his property or other legal rights. 153 C. 37. Plaintiff, as a taxpayer, is an aggrieved person in a case in which traffic in liquor is involved without having to show that he has an interest peculiar to himself. Id., 117. Where transcript of board hearing was incomplete and plaintiff raised constitutional issue of confiscation, he should have been permitted to introduce additional evidence. Id., 343, 344. Cited. Id., 433, 437. In order to qualify as aggrieved persons under section, plaintiffs must show that the value of their property would be lessened or that their legal rights would be injuriously affected. 154 C. 46, 47. Right to produce evidence under section may be waived by stipulation of a party. Id., 393. Plaintiffs did not qualify as aggrieved persons to appeal granting of variance where only claim to aggrievement was that their property adjoined that for which variance was granted. 155 C. 241, 242. In light of record and express allegations of impropriety and illegality, additional testimony of what occurred at executive session of board was necessary and permitted. Id., 245. Where plaintiff appealed claiming amendments were an unconstitutional denial of due process since they were confiscatory and would put him out of business, trial court should have permitted introduction of additional evidence limited to question of constitutionality of ordinance, complete transcript of hearings before commission being insufficient evidence in the case. Id., 265. Cited. 155 C. 365. Order of reference for a finding of facts on the issue of aggrievement and to take additional evidence to complete the record is not final judgment from which appeal lies under Sec. 52-263. Id., 617. While plaintiffs were not “aggrieved persons”, appeal was considered because of unusual circumstances of trial below. 157 C. 520. When construction of new building under zoning variance sought would affect use of plaintiff's parking facilities, plaintiff is an aggrieved person entitled to appeal from zoning board's decision. 158 C. 187. New evidence may be introduced only on a direct appeal from action of board, not in action to enjoin successful applicants for a zoning variance. Id., 202. Limit of time for appeal prevented retroactive application of procedural amendment giving abutting landowners statutory right to appeal. Id., 331. Appeals must be taken under this section and Sec. 8-9 rather than any city charter sections; aggrievement means plaintiffs were specially and injuriously affected in their property or other legal rights by board's decision. 159 C. 1. Trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of town council in granting a change of zone for special development district. Id., 212. When zoning authority gives reasons for action it takes, question for court to determine on appeal is whether reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and pertinent to considerations which must be applied under applicable zoning regulations. Id., 534, 540. Abutting landowners have standing to appeal a zoning commission's decision. 160 C. 239. Cited. 161 C. 32; 162 C. 45, 74, 238; 163 C. 379, 615. Abutting landowner who successfully opposed application is not entitled to notice of appeal. 164 C. 187. Record of board proceeding, including exhibits, may be reconstructed by evidence in court. Id., 215. Cited. 165 C. 185; 166 C. 102; Id., 112. A resident taxpayer of a town is an “aggrieved person” with standing to appeal decision of town's zoning board to extend a nonconforming liquor store use. 167 C. 596. There is no aggrievement which is prerequisite to right of appeal when a “floating zone” is designated without attachment to particular property or area in the town. 168 C. 285. Cited. 171 C. 480; 172 C. 286; 173 C. 408; 174 C. 493; 176 C. 475; 177 C. 440; 178 C. 364; 179 C. 250; Id., 650; 180 C. 296; 181 C. 230; Id., 556; 185 C. 135; 186 C 32; Id., 106. Provisions of statute which are inconsistent with provisions of Sec. 51-197d(11) are repealed by implication. 188 C. 555. Cited. 190 C. 746; 195 C. 276; 196 C. 623. Life tenant has sufficient ownership to be entitled to recognition as a “person owning land” with right of appeal. 203 C. 317. Cited. 205 C. 413; Id., 703; 206 C. 374; 208 C. 146; Id., 476; Id., 480; 209 C. 652; 211 C. 78; Id., 85; Id., 416; Id., 662; 212 C. 375; Id., 471; Id., 628; 213 C. 604; 214 C. 400; 217 C. 588; 219 C. 511; 220 C. 584; Id., 929; 221 C. 374; 222 C. 262; Id., 380; Id., 541. Upon judicial appeal from zoning board of appeals pursuant to section, trial court must focus on decision of the board because it is the subject of the appeal. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 256 affirmed in part and modified in part. 226 C. 80. Cited. Id., 230; Id., 314; Id., 757; 228 C. 476; 229 C. 178; 232 C. 122; Id., 270; 234 C. 498; 236 C. 681; 237 C. 184; 239 C. 515. Where applicant denied for hardship, plaintiff not required to submit alternative plans before submitting claim for inverse condemnation. 247 C. 196.
Cited. 1 CA 285; 2 CA 384; Id., 506; Id., 595; 3 CA 172; Id., 496. A coholder of a life interest in property is a “person owning land” entitled to appeal under statute. Id., 550. Cited. Id., 556; Id., 576; 4 CA 205; Id., 271; Id., 500; 5 CA 455; Id., 520; 6 CA 110; Id., 317; Id., 715; 8 CA 556; 9 CA 538; 13 CA 699; 15 CA 729; 16 CA 281; Id., 604; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 628; 17 CA 150; 18 CA 69; Id., 85; Id., 159; Id., 195; Id., 488; Id., 549; Id., 722; 20 CA 302; Id., 474; Id., 561; 21 CA 340; Id., 421; 22 CA 407; Id., 606; 23 CA 75; Id., 232; Id., 256; Id., 258; 24 CA 172; 25 CA 199; 27 CA 297; Id., 590; 28 CA 344; 29 CA 402; 32 CA 799; 34 CA 685; 35 CA 204; Id., 317; Id., 599; 37 CA 105; 43 CA 545; Id., 563; 45 CA 653. Zoning board required to hold a hearing on plaintiff's zoning application. 69 CA 230. Plaintiff's failure to appeal imposition of required “sidewalk fund” contribution did not meet exceptions to rule against collateral attacks on zoning commission actions and thus was properly dismissed. 85 CA 606.
Wide discretion in board. 1 CS 89. Compared with number 305 of special acts of 1931. 10 CS 194. Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from board. 11 CS 489. Mode of service on board discussed; notice to chairman sufficient compliance; time for appeal excludes day of act. 17 CS 116. Officer of corporation which would be affected by variance is not “person aggrieved”. 15 CS 362. Building inspector is. 19 CS 349. Resident landowner of town not living in borough is “aggrieved person” in action by borough zoning board. Id., 446. In an appeal from granting of variance for sale of liquor, a “person aggrieved” held to include any landowner, resident or taxpayer of municipality affected. 21 CS 102. History discussed; where, due to mechanical failure of the recording machine no transcript is available, court may not remand case for rehearing, but it may permit introduction of additional evidence to determine what considerations were presumptively in minds of board members. 23 CS 6; judgment reversed, see 150 C. 411. Cited. 25 CS 276. This section and Secs. 8-3 and 8-9 are not so linked that the date of publication of notice must be considered as the date the decision was rendered. 26 CS 88. Part owner of property is not precluded, merely because her co-owners have not joined with her, from showing that she, as an aggrieved person, has the right to appeal to the court. Id., 170. Circumstances under which board's decisions should be overruled discussed. Id., 256. Equitable relief outside the framework of appeal procedure set up by statute might be granted in the presence of allegations of fraudulent connivance or collusion on the part of local zoning board of appeals; plaintiffs have been granted equitable relief when the zoning authority lacked the jurisdiction to take the action which plaintiff was challenging; equitable relief by way of an injunction will not be granted if the court finds that the legal remedy afforded by statute has not been exhausted. Id., 334, 335. Chairman of town planning and zoning commission is aggrieved person within section and may appeal variance granted defendant by zoning board of appeals of town. 28 CS 278. Cited. 29 CS 5; 30 CS 157; 31 CS 197; 32 CS 104; Id., 223; Id., 625; 33 CS 175; Id., 607; 35 CS 246. Portion of section in conflict with amendment to Sec. 51-197d is repealed by implication. 38 CS 356. Cited. Id., 492; 39 CS 426; Id., 523; 41 CS 218; Id., 398; 42 CS 256; 43 CS 373. Claim re denial of permit to establish a public parking lot does not require recognition of a state Bivens action because plaintiff's existing remedy under section is appropriate. 51 CS 636.
Subsec. (a):
Failure to allege publication provisions is not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal of appeal. 211 C. 78; Id., 416; Id., 662. Cited. 212 C. 628; 214 C. 407; 218 C. 65; Id., 265; Id., 438; 225 C. 1; 230 C. 140; 233 C. 198. Court reaffirmed long-standing interpretation of “aggrieved person” that provides that any taxpayer has automatic standing to appeal decisions involving the sale of liquor in community. 262 C. 393. When zoning decision affects a single property within a zone, “land involved in the decision of the board,” as used in Subdiv. (1), does not include the entire zone of which the affected property is part. 271 C. 152. Party was not “aggrieved” because he did not own the property that was subject to zoning application and did not own land abutting or within 100 feet of the property. 285 C. 381. Party was aggrieved under Subdiv. (1) because “land involved” language refers to the entire property abutted, even when the parcel at issue is distinct in terms of its use within a multiuse development and in terms of the application to commission. 290 C. 313. The phrase “any person” includes persons who own land in another state. 297 C. 414. Subsec. does not afford statutory aggrievement in historic district commission appeals brought pursuant to Sec. 7-147i. 325 C. 765.
Cited. 4 CA 633. Statutory aggrievement and classical aggrievement discussed. 7 CA 632. Cited. 18 CA 99; 19 CA 357; 30 CA 511; 31 CA 643; 45 CA 653. Since zoning is meant to protect the public at large, without some particular harm, such as the maintenance of a nuisance affecting the land of plaintiff or a statute allowing the maintenance of plaintiff's lawsuit, plaintiff can have no standing. 49 CA 669. Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeal. 87 CA 277. Plaintiff, as town's zoning enforcement officer, was statutorily aggrieved and had standing to bring appeal challenging approval of a variance granted by town's zoning board of appeals. Id., 533. Plaintiff's access easement did not give plaintiff undisturbed possession of the land or a right to the profit of the land; accordingly, plaintiff did not fit into the category of an owner of land, for purposes of determining standing, because his rights and privileges did not confer a sufficient benefit. 109 CA 777. Plaintiff's failure to state factual basis for statutory aggrievement in complaint deprived court of subject matter jurisdiction. 113 CA 502. Subdiv. (1): Text amendment created a defined, bounded zoning district, and landed plaintiff is statutorily aggrieved because his property falls within the particular zone to which the text amendment pertained, regardless of his ability to opt out of amendments because his decision to opt out does not affect whether his neighbors opt out. 127 CA 87. Plaintiffs' allegations that they own property in the country residential zone and that defendant redefined buildable area solely in the country residential zone is sufficient to establish statutory aggrievement. 130 CA 587. When a zoning commission, as part of its sua sponte application to amend its zoning regulations or zoning map, refrains from taking action to alter in any manner the zoning classification of a particular property that is not specified in the application as the subject thereof, that property is not “land involved in the decision” of the commission pursuant to Subdiv. (1). 150 CA 489.
Cited. 41 CS 593. The trustee of a revocable trust has a sufficient ownership interest to be considered an owner for statutory aggrievement purposes. 51 CS 190.
Subsec. (b):
Failure to name statutorily mandated necessary party in citation is a jurisdictional defect. 205 C. 413. Mandates that clerk of municipality be properly cited and served as a necessary party. 206 C. 374. Cited. 207 C. 67. Clerk of fire district is a clerk of municipality required to be served. 212 C. 375. Cited. Id., 471; Id., 628; 218 C. 438; 220 C. 455; 222 C. 374; 224 C. 823; 225 C. 1; Id., 691; Id., 731; 227 C. 71; 228 C. 785; 232 C. 419; 235 C. 448. Planning commission's decision to settle pending appeal by entering into a stipulated judgment is not a “decision” within meaning of Subsec., and therefore is not appealable. 259 C. 607. Does not shorten legislatively prescribed time period within which plaintiff must serve process on the commission and the municipality, when fifteenth day falls on a day when municipal offices are closed, since to do so would deny plaintiff any remedy and leave it without recourse for what may be an otherwise meritorious appeal. 270 C. 42. Plain language of Subsec. clearly provides that any person statutorily aggrieved may take an appeal; thus, there was no merit to planning and zoning commission's claim that J Co. must be an applicant or partner in proposed project in order to be aggrieved by commission's denial of M's applications. 278 C. 660.
Cited. 13 CA 165; 18 CA 99; 24 CA 172; 29 CA 28; 31 CA 643; 35 CA 646; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 448; 45 CA 89; Id., 653. Trial court improperly held that special permit was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, substituted its interpretation of town's regulations and its judgment for those of the commission. 53 CA 636. Plaintiff appealing planning and zoning commission decision did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies where he had no actual or constructive notice of commission's findings that defendant complied with town's zoning regulations. 66 CA 508. Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeal. 87 CA 277.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 215 C. 58. Trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's zoning appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction reversed; right to appeal decision of zoning board to Superior Court and procedure prescribed in section shall be liberally interpreted in any case where strict adherence to these provisions would work surprise or injustice; although plaintiffs' zoning appeal citation should have named town clerk, plaintiffs had in fact served citation on town clerk, thus plaintiffs' failure to so name town clerk is not a defect that deprived trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. 278 C. 751. In passing P.A. 04-78, legislature clearly and specifically provided that for any zoning appeal taken prior to October 1, 2004, process was to be served in accordance with Subsec. only; since appeal was served on July 15, 2003, and plaintiffs' marshal followed the service requirements of Sec. 52-57(b)(5), leaving two copies of appeal papers with town clerk, plaintiffs did not comply with service requirements of this Subsec. which sets forth exclusive method for service of process in zoning appeals taken before October 1, 2004, and plaintiffs failed to make proper service of process for their zoning appeal. 279 C. 672. Where marshal filed one copy of process on town clerk, actual service was made and failure to file two copies of process on town clerk constituted formal defect that could be corrected pursuant to Subsec. (p). 297 C. 414.
Cited. 43 CA 606.
Subsec. (i):
Nothing in the language of section explicitly indicates that filing the record with the court was intended to be the only requirement placed on zoning authorities regarding service or that, having authorized appeals to the Superior Court, the legislature intended that the court's normal procedural rules as to service were not to be operative. 50 CS 453.
Subsec. (k):
Cited. 218 C. 438; 233 C. 198.
Cited. 25 CA 137; 40 CA 840; 43 CA 105; Id., 512. Statute does not say that trial court is required to hold evidentiary hearing. 78 CA 561. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing additional evidence to be presented in zoning appeal where plaintiff was specific in spelling out the nature of his claim and who was a pro se individual objecting to a petition before the commission. 110 CA 349.
Subsec. (l):
Court reiterated previous holdings that based on evidence presented at trial, the judgment of a planning and zoning commission denying site plan application can be affirmed, reversed, modified or revised where there is no evidence or basis to support commission's decision re qualification as permitted basic neighborhood store and re evaluation of provision of parking that met zoning regulations. 287 C. 746.
Subsec. (m):
Hearing held pursuant to Subsec. serves to protect the public interest by guarding against any attempt by settling parties to evade judicial review and scrutiny by potentially aggrieved landowners. 259 C. 607.
Subsec. (n):
Purpose of hearing is to protect public interest and neither a pretrial conference nor a court hearing to enforce a settlement met the statutory requirement. 247 C. 732.
Plaintiff's appeal was moot since remand hearing was the proper forum for plaintiff to challenge the proposed settlement based on alleged negative environmental impact. 133 CA 173.
Subsec. (o):
Cited. 220 C. 61; 222 C. 374; 224 C. 823; 225 C. 1; Id., 691; Id., 731; 228 C. 498. Requirement of certification by Appellate Court held applicable to affordable housing land use appeals. 245 C. 257. Failure to make service of process on clerk of the municipality is fatal jurisdictional flaw not remedied by savings clause. 257 C. 604.
Cited. 25 CA 572; 35 CA 646; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 448.
Subsec. (q):
Plaintiff's failure to serve the borough clerk was not a technical defect in form but a substantive defect in service that could not be cured by the savings provision of Subsec.; it is the duty of plaintiff rather than the marshal to identify who must be served. 285 C. 240.
Subsec. (r):
Legislature specifically intended the limitation period to apply only to challenges of failures of notice postdating January 1, 1999, as expressed in P.A. 00-84. 98 CA 213. Subsec. prohibits an appeal made more than 1 year from an action of the commission claimed to have been made without proper notice. 120 CA 50. One year appeal period is triggered only when the commission itself, not defendant applicants, fails to comply with notice requirement. 165 CA 488.

Structure Connecticut General Statutes