New Mexico Statutes
Part 4 - TRAFFIC LAWS GENERALLY
Section 66-7-349 - Stopping, standing or parking outside of business or residence districts.

A. Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district, no person shall stop, park or leave standing a vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main-traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park or leave the vehicle off such part of the highway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicles shall be available from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction upon the highway.
B. Subsection A of this section does not apply to the driver of a vehicle that is disabled while on the paved or main-traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the disabled vehicle in that position.
C. The state highway and transportation department, unless otherwise directed by an investigating police officer, or a police officer may remove or cause to be removed a vehicle or other obstruction from the paved or main-traveled part of a highway to the nearest place of safety if the vehicle or other obstruction obstructs traffic or poses a traffic hazard.
History: 1953 Comp., § 64-7-349, enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 35, § 453; 1999, ch. 96, § 1.
Cross references. — For the definitions of "business district" and "residence district", see 66-1-4.2 NMSA 1978 and 66-1-4.15 NMSA 1978, respectively.
For regulations concerning buses or trucks stopped or disabled on highways, see 66-3-851 to 66-3-857 NMSA 1978.
For the penalty assessment for violation of this section, see 66-8-116 NMSA 1978.
For the parking privilege for passenger motor vehicle of disabled person, see 3-51-46 NMSA 1978.
The 1999 amendment, effective June 18, 1999, added "Subsection A of" at the beginning of Subsection B; added Subsection C; and made minor stylistic changes.
Purpose of the phrase "or leave standing." — By the use of the phrase "or leave standing" the Legislature intended to make illegal any stopping and leaving of a vehicle on the highway for any length of time, unless, of course, as stated in the statute, the conditions be such that the car cannot be moved off the highway. Duncan v. Madrid, 1940-NMSC-027, 44 N.M. 249, 101 P.2d 382
Violation is negligence per se. — As it is foreseeable that blocking the highway may cause other persons to have accidents, a violation of Section 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), which prohibits such blocking is negligence per se. Kelly v. Montoya, 1970-NMCA-063, 81 N.M. 591, 470 P.2d 563.
Driver must always park off highway when practical to do so; the other requirements of clear view and sufficient passing space are not pertinent unless and until it is shown that it is impractical to park off the highway at the particular place in question. Horrocks v. Rounds, 1962-NMSC-048, 70 N.M. 73, 370 P.2d 799.
If impractical for car to park entirely off highway, it is not a violation of the provisions of Section 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), for it to be parked partially or entirely on the highway, regardless of the reason for stopping, so long as the other mandatory provisions of the statute are met; i.e., that an unobstructed width of highway opposite the standing vehicle is left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle is available for a distance of 200 feet in each direction. Horrocks v. Rounds, 1962-NMSC-048, 70 N.M. 73, 370 P.2d 799.
Truck negligently stopped on highway has duty to warn others. — Having had the opportunity to steer his truck to the side of the highway when it began chugging, the statute imposed upon the defendant the duty of so doing. It was this negligence of the defendant, and not any impracticability of driving off of the lane of traffic and stopping his truck as he did that caused it to stop on the paved portion of the highway, and the defendant, after he found himself unable to move his truck, owed the duty to plaintiffs and others approaching the same, to exercise reasonable care to warn them of their peril. Gutierrez v. Koury, 1953-NMSC-109, 57 N.M. 741, 263 P.2d 557.
Negligence per se to park truck on highway without flares. — Where driver stopped truck without displaying flares on main traveled portion of highway at point where it was not impracticable to have parked it off the pavement, and backed truck up without observing whether it could be done with safety, the violation of statutory provisions constituted negligence per se. Chandler v. Battenfield, 1951-NMSC-054, 55 N.M. 361, 233 P.2d 1047.
Stopping on pavement. — The only excuse for stopping on the pavement is an emergency or exigency which leaves no other choice. Turner v. Silver, 1978-NMCA-107, 92 N.M. 313, 587 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d 1089.
Vehicle is "disabled" when it runs out of gasoline. Turner v. Silver, 1978-NMCA-107, 92 N.M. 313, 587 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d 1089.
Negligence per se does not entitle party to directed verdict. — In a wrongful death action that arose from an automobile collision involving defendant's automobile which was standing without lights, a violation of Section 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), the court told the jury that if they found that the defendant violated this provision he was guilty of negligence per se. Establishment of defendant's negligence per se did not entitle plaintiff to a directed verdict. However, it was error for the court to refuse an instruction that in cases of willful and wanton conduct the defense of contributory negligence is to be disregarded. Boatright v. Sclivia, 421 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1970).
Violation proper question for jury. — Violations of Sections 64-18-4, 1953 Comp. (similar to Section 66-7-305 NMSA 1978) (driving so slow as to impede traffic), 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section) (stopping on a highway), and 66-7-318 NMSA 1978 (following too closely), which were enacted for the benefit of the public, were proper questions for jury. Archuleta v. Johnston, 1971-NMCA-158, 83 N.M. 380, 492 P.2d 997, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 379, 492 P.2d 996; Turner v. Silver, 1978-NMCA-107, 92 N.M. 313, 587 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 260, 586 P.2d 1089. .
Whether stopping negligence for trier of facts. — If motorist's vision becomes completely obscured due to a dust storm, the situation certainly imposes the duty to stop. Whether stopping upon the main traveled portion of the highway when it was practicable to stop off the highway was negligence was issuable and for the trier of facts. Williams v. Neff, 1958-NMSC-071, 64 N.M. 182, 326 P.2d 1073.
Unavoidable accident doctrine inapplicable where driver's own negligence created emergency. — Where the emergency or perilous situation is created through the driver's own negligence, he cannot avoid liability for injury on the ground that his acts were done in the stress of emergency and the court committed reversible error by instructing on unavoidable accident. Horrocks v. Rounds, 1962-NMSC-048, 70 N.M. 73, 370 P.2d 799.
Blocking of road by cars was not disorderly conduct under Section 30-20-1 NMSA 1978. Section 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), makes such conduct a separate and specified offense. If a road were blocked, the charge should have been under Section 64-18-49, 1953 Comp. State v. Florstedt, 1966-NMSC-208, 77 N.M. 47, 419 P.2d 248.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 271.
When is motor vehicle "disabled" or the like within exception to statute regulating parking or stopping, 15 A.L.R.2d 909.
Construction and effect in civil actions of statute, ordinance or regulation requiring vehicles to be stopped or parked parallel with, or within certain distance of, curb, 17 A.L.R.2d 582.
Liability for injury or damage growing out of motor vehicle pulling out from parked position, 29 A.L.R.2d 107.
Right to park vehicles on private way, 37 A.L.R.2d 944.
Liability of owner or operator of automobile for injury to one assisting in extricating or starting his stalled or ditched car, 3 A.L.R.3d 780.
Liability of motorist colliding with person engaged about stalled or disabled vehicle on or near highway, 27 A.L.R.3d 12.
Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to collision between moving and stalled, parked or standing motor vehicle, 34 A.L.R.3d 570.
Construction of statute as to parking or stopping motor vehicle on highway without flares, 37 A.L.R.3d 778.
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 330 to 333; 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 714(1).

Structure New Mexico Statutes