New Mexico Statutes
Part 4 - TRAFFIC LAWS GENERALLY
Section 66-7-335 - Crossing at other than crosswalks.

A. A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
B. Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
C. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
D. A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a penalty assessment misdemeanor.
History: 1953 Comp., § 64-7-335, enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 35, § 439; 2018, ch. 74, § 45.
Cross references. — For definitions applicable to this section, see 66-1-4 to 66-1-4.20 NMSA 1978.
For the penalty assessment for violation, see 66-8-116 NMSA 1978.
For duty of driver to take precautions when approaching blind person, see 28-7-4 NMSA 1978.
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, provided a penalty for a violation of the provisions of this section, and made technical changes; and added Subsection D.
Provision does not just apply to city streets. — Section 64-18-34, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), was intended to have broad and general application and was not intended to apply only on city streets. Williams v. Burke, 1960-NMSC-134, 68 N.M. 35, 357 P.2d 1087.
Pedestrian must yield right-of-way to vehicles on highway. — Section 64-18-34, 1953 Comp. (similar to this section), applied in every situation where a pedestrian attempted to cross a road where there was no intersection or marked crosswalk and placed upon the pedestrian a duty to yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the highway. Williams v. Burke, 1960-NMSC-134, 68 N.M. 35, 357 P.2d 1087.
Driver has right to assume pedestrian will observe section's dictates. — While a driver of an automobile across intersections is charged with notice that a pedestrian may have the right-of-way, and is required to observe reasonable care to accord such to the pedestrian, yet as between intersections the automobile has the right-of-way and the driver has a right to assume that pedestrians will observe this rule, consequently, he is not required to anticipate that a pedestrian will step from the curb or leave the crosswalk and attempt to cross a street between intersections, and a mere failure to anticipate such act upon the part of a pedestrian would not be negligence in a driver unless the driver saw, or in the exercise of reasonable caution should see, a pedestrian attempting to cross between intersections or outside of crosswalks in time to avoid a collision. Gallegos v. McKee, 1962-NMSC-008, 69 N.M. 443, 367 P.2d 934).
Crossing outside crosswalk at least technical violation. — Since plaintiff had attempted to cross a city street at a point other than a regular pedestrian crosswalk, plaintiff was in at least technical violation of the right-of-way provisions of the state statutes and of the city ordinances. Sanchez v. Gomez, 1953-NMSC-053, 57 N.M. 383, 259 P.2d 346.
Pedestrian was guilty of negligence per se in crossing street in the middle of the block in the nighttime so that she was struck by a car with its headlights burning and of which she had an unobstructed view. McMinn v. Thompson, 1956-NMSC-089, 61 N.M. 387, 301 P.2d 326.
Question of proximate cause of injury still remains. — Where pedestrian himself was guilty of negligence in violating both a statute and municipal code, by attempting to cross the intersection outside the crosswalk, the plaintiff was negligent per se but that still left open under the facts the question whether that negligence was a proximately contributory factor in his injury, and the jury was entitled to answer that question. Terry v. Bisswell, 1958-NMSC-045, 64 N.M. 153, 326 P.2d 89.
Jury must be allowed to answer question of proximate cause. — Trial court should not have held as a matter of law that plaintiff in crossing of street at other than crosswalk was the proximate contributing cause of her injury and directed a verdict against her because it was the province of the jury to determine such question and to award the plaintiff damages if it determined the issue in the negative. McMinn v. Thompson, 1956-NMSC-089, 61 N.M. 387, 301 P.2d 326.
Mere concurrence of violation of traffic regulation with accident in point of time does not, of itself, render the violation a concurring cause of the injury. Terry v. Bisswell, 1958-NMSC-045, 64 N.M. 153, 326 P.2d 89.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 286.
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 389.

Structure New Mexico Statutes