New Mexico Statutes
Article 1 - Workers' Compensation
Section 52-1-1 - Short title.

Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978 shall be known and may be cited as the "Workers' Compensation Act".
History: Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 1; C.S. 1929, § 156-101; 1941 Comp., § 57-901; 1953 Comp., § 59-10-1; Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 1; 1987, ch. 235, § 1.
Cross references. — For Occupational Disease Disablement Law, see 52-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For no compensation payable under Workers' Compensation Act for occupational disease, see 52-3-46 NMSA 1978.
For when members of New Mexico mounted patrol are covered by Workers' Compensation Act, see 29-6-5 NMSA 1978.
For premiums for workers' compensation insurance as material furnished in remedies against contractors performance bond, see 48-2-17 NMSA 1978.
For hospital liens upon personal injury damages recovered not including workers' compensation, see 48-8-1 NMSA 1978.
For Occupational Health and Safety Act not to supersede or affect Workers' Compensation Act, see 50-9-21 NMSA 1978.
For Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Pool Act, see 59A-33-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For safety devices required by Mining Safety Act as also required by Workers' Compensation Act, see 69-8-15 NMSA 1978.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Sufficient evidence of employment. — Where worker testified that employer's manager hired worker to drive employer's truck and instructed worker to take the truck to a gas station and purchase fuel and that worker discovered a defective light while inspecting the truck in preparation for driving it and was trying to get information on having the light fixed when worker was injured; a fax dated after the accident referred to the manager's efforts to find a replacement driver for worker from another trucking company; and employer filed an injury report with the workers' compensation administration in the employer's home state, there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that worker was an employee of employer. Nelson v. Homier Distrib. Co., Inc., 2009-NMCA-125, 147 N.M. 318, 222 P.3d 690.
Constitutionality upheld. — The court's former ruling in State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 1957-NMSC-075, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 is expressly overruled and the creation of a workmen's [workers'] compensation administration and vesting in it the determination of controversies thereunder is held to be a valid constitutional exercise of legislative power. Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381.
The Workers' Compensation Act does not violate equal protection. Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Const. Co., 1985-NMCA-087, 103 N.M. 294, 706 P.2d 158.
The Workers' Compensation Act does not violate substantive due process. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250.
Workmen's [Workers'] compensation is not a fundamental right. Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, and appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242.
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory; its provisions apply to all workers subject to it. Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, and appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242.
Supreme court without jurisdiction to eliminate rights conferred by act. — Supreme court is without jurisdiction to eliminate rights that were conferred in the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act by the legislature. Gonzales v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 1947-NMSC-021, 51 N.M. 121, 179 P.2d 762.
Court not to alter clear legislative condition. — It is not the province of the court, but of the legislature, to make changes in the provisions of statute law. Where the law-making body has specified clearly who shall be entitled to compensation benefits and under what circumstances, the court should not alter the conditions required to obtain such benefits. Sanchez v. Bernalillo Cnty., 1953-NMSC-038, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909.
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is not exclusive remedy of the employee. — An employee has a claim against a third party. Montanez v. Cass, 1975-NMCA-142, 89 N.M. 32, 546 P.2d 1189, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. N.M. Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 1976-NMSC-028, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634.
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not make employer an insurer of the employee against injury or death occurring during his hours of employment. Little v. J. Korber & Co., 1963-NMSC-012, 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119.
Employer not an insurer. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not make the employer an insurer of the employee against injury or death occurring during his hours of employment. The burden is always on a plaintiff to establish that the employee sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment and arising out of it. Where there is a sequence of events in rapid order, such a brief hiatus of time between exertion, followed by the quenching of thirst with refrigerated water and, then, sudden death, the natural experience of mankind suggests there likely is a causal connection between the strain and exhaustion, on the one hand, and the consequent death on the other. The latter, of course, may not rest on mere suspicion, surmise or guess. But it may arise as a fair and legitimate inference from circumstances in evidence. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.
Reduction in earning capacity has always been primary concern of workmen's [workers'] compensation legislation. Webb v. Hamilton, 1968-NMSC-008, 78 N.M. 647, 436 P.2d 507, overruled on other grounds by Am. Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Vocational rehabilitation. — Under this chapter, an injured worker is entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services as are necessary to return her to suitable employment. While this requirement is mandatory in nature, the worker has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence so as to establish a need for rehabilitation benefits. Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710.
No express consent by state to be sued in act. — The language appearing in Section 21-7-4 NMSA 1978 relating to the powers of the board of regents of the university, "of suing and being sued, or contracting and being contracted with," are grants of power to sue and be sued only upon such matters as are within the scope of other corporate powers of such institutions, while on the other hand, the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is in derogation of the common law, sui generis and contains therein no express consent by the state to be sued. Zamora v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1955-NMSC-077, 60 N.M. 41, 287 P.2d 237.
Negligence action against state under special law. — Laws 1947, ch. 162, allowing a particular person to sue the state for injuries resulting from its negligence is a special law (no other person who might have a like claim could prosecute such a suit under the act); hence, since a general law could be enacted providing that the state shall be liable to persons injured or killed on account of the negligence of the state, its officers and employees, the act in question is void. Lucero v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1951-NMSC-017, 55 N.M. 157, 228 P.2d 945.
No statute forbidding benefits to worker receiving benefits under other statute. — There is no provision in the compensation statute forbidding benefits to an injured worker on the ground that he is receiving benefits under some other local or federal statute. Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836 (see Section 52-1-47.1 NMSA 1978).
A worker is not precluded from recovering benefits under both the Public Employees' Retirement Act and the Workers' Compensation Act. Montney v. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't, 1989-NMCA-002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, superseded by statute, Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-057, 141 N.M. 617, 159 P.3d 266.
This section imposes upon board of regents no legal obligation to compensate financially for injuries sustained by their workmen [workers] in the course of their employment. Zamora v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1955-NMSC-077, 60 N.M. 41, 287 P.2d 237.
Measure of disability. — There is no presumption in the Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Law that every workman [worker] is completely able-bodied when he enters his employment; the measure of disability under the statute is the relationship between the workman's [worker's] ability to do work prior to the injury, and such ability following the injury. Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836.
If a veterans administration payment is a pension, it cannot be considered to reduce the amount of workmen's [workers'] compensation. Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836.
Evidence of dependency upon decedent. — If there is substantial support in the evidence for the finding that plaintiffs were not dependent to any extent upon the decedent within the meaning, purpose and intent of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, then plaintiffs must fail on appeal. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775.
Compensation benefits not community assets. — Compensation benefits payable under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, under this section, for injuries sustained during coverture, are not community assets. Richards v. Richards, 1955-NMSC-043, 59 N.M. 308, 283 P.2d 881.
Preexisting disability not disabling under act. — Finding of the trial court that the 15% partial permanent disability, set forth in the certificate of preexisting disability was, in truth and in fact, not disabling so as to interfere with his ability to work in any particular, establishes that plaintiff did not have a preexisting disability under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act even when the doctor's answers to questions raised a conflict in the evidence concerning the application of the Subsequent Injury Act. Ballard v. Southwest Potash Corp., 1969-NMCA-008, 80 N.M. 10, 450 P.2d 448.
Condition for compensation where preexisting impairment present. — Assuming a certificate of preexisting impairment and assuming that procedural requirements are met, applicability of the act depends on four things: (a) a preexisting permanent physical impairment; (b) a subsequent disability compensable under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act; (c) the subsequent disability must be permanent and (d) the subsequent disability must be materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone. Ballard v. Southwest Potash Corp., 1969-NMCA-008, 80 N.M. 10, 450 P.2d 448.
A stroke causally connected to work stress was compensable, even though the worker suffered from a preexisting condition, hypertension, which made the workman [worker] more susceptible to injury. Shadbolt v. Schneider, Inc., 1985-NMCA-086, 103 N.M. 544, 710 P.2d 738, cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986).
Traumatic neurosis compensable. — Traumatic neurosis, when directly caused by an accident within the purview of this act, was compensable. Jensen v. United Perlite Corp., 1966-NMSC-111, 76 N.M. 384, 415 P.2d 356, overruled on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Whether legislature intended fee collected from compensation cases. — Whether or not fee levied upon all civil actions filed was generally being collected could not influence decision as to whether legislature intended fee to be collected from those filing workmen's [workers'] compensation claims. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-NMSC-186, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504 (decided under former law).
Supreme court addition fund fee not collected where other fees are not. — By making the supreme court addition fund fee collectible "in addition" to other fees. it is certain that the legislature did not intend for it to be collected where the other fees were not. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-NMSC-186, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504 (decided under former law).
Anyone as workman [worker] not excluded. — Nothing in the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is indicative of an intention to exclude from its benefits anyone who is in fact performing duties of a "workman [worker]." Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.
Refusal to find medical causation supported. — Where doctor who testified as to claimant's epilepsy stated that he could not say, with any certainty, that the epilepsy was caused by accident, trial court's refusal to find "medical causation" was supported. Torres v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 1971-NMCA-043, 82 N.M. 511, 484 P.2d 353.
Employer's liability not diminished because workman [worker] works while on compensation. — To hold that the employer's liability should be diminished because his injured workman (worker) has seen fit to suffer the discomforts of his infirmity and obtain employment, rather than to simply exist on the compensation the law allows him, seems inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958).
Employer entitled to credit for monies paid under contractual benefits plan. — Trial court did not err in granting an employer credit against workers' compensation benefits for monies paid to its employee under the employer's accident and disability plans, where the benefit plan was in the nature of a contract and the employee's rights should be equally governed by it. Carter v. Mountain Bell, 1986-NMCA-103, 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956.
Repair of school building as extra-hazardous employment. — Carpenter engaged in repair of school building was engaged in "extra-hazardous employment" covered by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act even though when he was injured he was merely hanging venetian blinds. Scofield v. Lordsburg Mun. Sch. Dist., 1949-NMSC-027, 53 N.M. 249, 205 P.2d 834 (decided under former law).
Disability en route to cafe compensable where employer gave consent. — Where workman [worker] employed as janitor, laborer and night watchman sustains disability while en route to nearby cafe where, with employer's knowledge and consent and no deduction in pay, workman [worker] ate lunch, disability is compensable. Sullivan v. Rainbo Baking Co., 1962-NMSC-138, 71 N.M. 9, 375 P.2d 326.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.
This act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed to effect its purpose. Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 4, 154 P.2d 1000; Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 1941-NMSC-033, 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342; Malone v. Swift Fresh Meats Co., 1978-NMSC-007, 91 N.M. 359, 574 P.2d 283; Security Trust v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248.
Liberal construction. — Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be construed liberally. Corzine v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1969-NMCA-051, 80 N.M. 418, 456 P.2d 892, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 388, 456 P.2d 221; Wilson v. Mason, 1967-NMCA-002, 78 N.M. 27, 426 P.2d 789.
As is true in all humanitarian statutes, remedial in nature, the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act has received a liberal interpretation from both trial judges and appellate courts in New Mexico. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).
It is the duty of supreme court to construe the compensation act liberally to give effect to its benevolent purpose and to construe the findings of the court liberally so as to support the judgment. Casados v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1967-NMSC-212, 78 N.M. 392, 432 P.2d 103, overruled on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
The court is committed to liberal construction of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act in favor of the workman [worker], and the injury need not result momentarily in order to be accidental; yet, some relationship between the accident relied upon and the injury suffered must be established. It cannot rest upon mere speculation. Lemon v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 1954-NMSC-121, 58 N.M. 830, 277 P.2d 542; Henderson v. Texas-N.M. Pipe Line Co., 1942-NMSC-060, 46 N.M. 458, 131 P.2d 269.
Reasonable doubts resolved in favor of employees. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act must be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts resolved in favor of employees. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365; Sena v. Continental Cas. Co., 1982-NMCA-060, 97 N.M. 753, 643 P.2d 622, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.
Workmen's [Workers'] compensation statutes should be liberally and fairly construed in the workman's [worker's] favor to insure the full measure of his exclusive statutory remedy. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958).
The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Briscoe v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 1975-NMCA-147, 88 N.M. 568, 544 P.2d 283; Briggs v. Zia Co., 1957-NMSC-074, 63 N.M. 148, 315 P.2d 217; Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, Inc., 1975-NMSC-018, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327; Anaya v. N.M. Steel Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.
The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be given a liberal construction in favor of claimants. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502; Mann v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1954-NMSC-088, 58 N.M. 626, 274 P.2d 145.
The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Yardman v. Cooper, 1959-NMSC-043, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473, overruled on other grounds by Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680.
Liberal construction does not mean total disregard for statute. — This section is to be liberally construed in favor of claimant, but liberal construction does not mean total disregard for the statute, or repeal of it under the guise of construction. Copeland v. Black, 1959-NMSC-009, 65 N.M. 214, 334 P.2d 1116, overruled on other grounds by Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680; Anaya v. N.M. Steel Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.
The court has frequently held that the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant; however, liberal construction does not mean a total disregard for the statute, or repeal of it under the guise of construction. Ross v. Marberry & Co., 1960-NMSC-013, 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123.
Liberal construction does not mean total disregard for the statute. Yardman v. Cooper, 1959-NMSC-043, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473, overruled on other grounds by Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680; Varela v. Mounho, 1978-NMCA-086, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324.
Liberal construction does not mean enlarging apparent legislative intent. — The statute must be liberally construed in favor of the workman [worker], but this does not mean enlarging on the apparent legislative intent or giving words meaning beyond their ordinary scope. Hicks v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 1959-NMSC-076, 66 N.M. 165, 344 P.2d 475.
Liberal construction not to be construed so as to nullify its provisions. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is remedial and should be liberally interpreted so as to accomplish its purposes, while at the same time a reasonable construction must be accorded it, and it shall not be construed in such a way as to nullify certain of its provisions. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 1965-NMSC-053, 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156; Security Trust v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248; Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 1981-NMCA-121, 97 N.M. 51, 636 P.2d 322.
Court must construe act in reasonable manner. — The supreme court gives to the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act a liberal construction in favor of the laborer, but still the court must construe the act in a reasonable manner, and not in such a way as would abrogate certain portions of the statute to the preference of other portions thereof. Boggs v. D & L Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-044, 71 N.M. 502, 379 P.2d 788, overruled on other grounds by Am. Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Beneficent purpose not thwarted by technical refinement. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is remedial in nature; is given a liberal interpretation by both the trial and reviewing courts; reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee; its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement or interpretation. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled on other grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.
Technical precision in pleading not required. — Claims for workmen's [workers'] compensation are to be liberally construed and technical precision in pleading is not generally required. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co., 1962-NMSC-063, 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605.
Rule of liberal construction applies to Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Law, not to evidence offered in support of a claim under that law. Guidry v. Petty Concrete Co., 1967-NMSC-048, 77 N.M. 531, 424 P.2d 806.
Liberal construction has no application to consideration to be given by trier of fact. — The rule of liberal construction of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act has no application to the consideration, weight and credibility to be given the evidence by the trier of the facts. Young v. Signal Oilfield Serv., Inc., 1969-NMCA-125, 81 N.M. 67, 463 P.2d 43.
Although the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act must be liberally construed to effect its purpose, this view of liberal construction applies only to the law and not to the facts. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775; Brown v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 1962-NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.
Claimant not relieved of burden of proof. — The liberal construction of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act applies to the law, not to the evidence offered in support of a claim under the law. The rule of liberal construction does not relieve a claimant of the burden of establishing his right to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, nor does it permit a court to award compensation where the requisite proof is absent. Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.
Statute as sui generis. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is sui generis and creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedure uncontrolled by codes of procedure in actions at law or equity. Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 4, 154 P.2d 1000.
Workmen's [Workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights, remedies and procedures which are exclusive. They are in derogation of the common law and are not controlled or affected by the code of procedure in suits at law or actions in equity except as provided therein. Garza v. W.A. Jourdan, Inc., 1977-NMCA-136, 91 N.M. 268, 572 P.2d 1276, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d 1257.
Rights, remedies and procedure exclusive. — Workmen's [Workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights, remedies and procedures which are exclusive. Anaya v. City of Santa Fe, 1969-NMSC-025, 80 N.M. 54, 451 P.2d 303; Day v. Penitentiary of N.M., 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831.
Rules of procedure are not applicable except as specifically provided. — That workmen's [workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis, and that the rules of procedure in civil actions are not applicable except as specifically provided therein, has been long recognized by this court. Holman v. Oriental Refinery, 1965-NMSC-029, 75 N.M. 52, 400 P.2d 471.
The workmen's [workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights and procedures which are exclusive and are in derogation of the common law and the code of procedure with certain exceptions as provided in the statutes. Magee v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 1959-NMSC-027, 65 N.M. 314, 336 P.2d 1066.
Employment in violation of federal law still governed by Worker's Compensation Act. — Suit for wrongful death of 16-year-old who died from injuries incurred while working for employer was barred because the case was governed by the Worker's Compensation Act, despite the fact that the employment of the child was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The legislature's legalization of employment for 16-year-old workers in Section 50-6-4 NMSA 1978 reflects an intent that the exclusivity of the Worker's Compensation Act apply to such employment. Boyd v. Permian Servicing Co., 1992-NMSC-013, 113 N.M. 321, 825 P.2d 611.
Legislative intent as to purpose of elective act. — The purpose under an elective act such as this is to cause the employer to obtain compensation protection. It is contrary to legislative intent that any technical delay which in no way prejudices a claimant would give rise to a common-law suit. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589, 458 P.2d 841.
Purpose of act. — This act was evidently intended to extend its protection to persons who are not employees at common law. Its purpose is to avoid uncertainty in litigation and to assure the injured workmen and their dependents prompt payment of compensation. Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644, 58 S. Ct. 644, 82 L. Ed. 1106 (1938).
The basic purpose of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to ensure that industry carry the burden of personal injuries suffered by workers in the course of their employment. Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1986-NMCA-012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581.
The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act expresses the intention and policy of this state that employees who suffer disablement as a result of injuries causally connected to their work shall not become dependent upon the welfare programs of the state, but shall receive some portion of the wages they would have earned had it not been for the intervening disability. Casias v. Zia Co., 1979-NMCA-068, 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203.
The purpose of this act is to provide a humanitarian and economical system for compensating injured workmen, while being fair to the employer. Anaya v. N.M. Steel Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.
Primary purpose of Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to keep an injured workman [worker] and his family at least minimally secure financially; public policy demands it. Aranda v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 1979-NMCA-097, 93 N.M. 412, 600 P.2d 1202, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d 821; Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, and appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1981).
Purpose of Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to provide a form of recovery for workmen or his heirs. The employer is entitled to present whatever relevant evidence deemed necessary to establish its position, and it is the duty of the district court to see to the fulfillment of that statutory purpose within the framework of the facts and the law. Livingston v. Loffland Bros., 1974-NMCA-047, 86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988.
To avoid uncertainty in litigation and to assure injured workmen prompt payment of compensation, the court has often said that the act should be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes for which it was enacted. Mirabal v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1967-NMSC-043, 77 N.M. 576, 425 P.2d 740.
Spirit of this act flows in direction of workman [worker] and his protection; the compensation carrier should not seek technical, circuitous routes to avoid its responsibilities. Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212.
Purpose of depriving noncomplying employer of common-law defenses under an elective act such as this is to cause the employer to obtain compensation protection. It would seem contrary to legislative intent that any technical delay which in no way prejudices a claimant would give rise to a common-law suit. Mirabal v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1967-NMSC-043, 77 N.M. 576, 425 P.2d 740.
Purpose of industry carrying burden of injuries. — The basic purpose of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to ensure that industry carries the burden of personal injuries suffered by workmen in the course of their employment, and consequently, the relationship of the parties is not to be determined from the name attached to it by them, but from the consequences which the law imputes to their agreement to prevent evasion of the obligations which the act imposes upon employers. Yerbich v. Heald, 1976-NMCA-026, 89 N.M. 67, 547 P.2d 72.
Claims for compensation under Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act are judicial in nature, and constitute civil actions, and thus are actions subject to removal under the federal removal statute. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).
Idea of negligence foreign to recovery. — The idea of negligence as an essential to recovery is generally foreign to the theory of workmen's [workers'] compensation. Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685.
Interests of claimant and public paramount. — Within the policy considerations of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act the interests of the claimant and the public are paramount. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628; Ruiz v. City of Albuquerque, 1978-NMCA-015, 91 N.M. 526, 577 P.2d 424, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297.
Purpose of act. — To prevent claimant from being on welfare rolls was part of legislative scheme of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, and the legislative scheme was not meant to allow a recovery comparable to that in the normal tort recovery. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628.
Right to be sued must be found in act. — The rights and remedies provided by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act are in derogation of the common law and consent to be sued must be found in the act itself. Day v. Penitentiary of N.M., 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831.
Decisions of other states persuasive but not binding. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act of New Mexico is sui generis and creates rights, remedies and procedures which are exclusive; therefore, the decisions of other states, if any, which have comparable statutory provisions are persuasive but not binding on the court. Security Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 1975-NMSC-052, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222.
Performance of medical services within act's scope. — The fact that a person performed medical services, vel non, does not take her outside the scope of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. McKenzie v. Daubenheyer, 465 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.M. 1977).
Engineering works as used in section enumerating hazardous occupations does not include operation of a truck on a highway and the owner of a milk truck, accordingly, was not engaged in an "extra-hazardous occupation" making the truck driver's death compensable under the act. Hernandez v. Border Truck Line, 1946-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 396, 165 P.2d 120 (decided under former law).
III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP.
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is based upon employer-employee relationship. Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., Inc., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984.
The employer-employee relationship, to which the act applies, is one created by contract between the parties; consequently, if the employer in this case seeks to avail itself of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act as a bar to a common-law action, then it must show a valid contract of employment between it and the minor employee. Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., Inc., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984.
Supervision of results does not transform independent contractor to employee. — Supervision relating to results contracted to be accomplished does not transform the relationship of employer-independent contractor to that of employer-employee. Roybal v. Bates Lumber Co., 1966-NMSC-057, 76 N.M. 127, 412 P.2d 555.
Length of time in work irrelevant. — Whether the injured person had been doing work for five or 50 minutes, and whether he would have continued in this work for a shorter or greater length of time is irrelevant in determining whether one is a special employee. Wuertz v. Howard, 1966-NMSC-264, 77 N.M. 228, 421 P.2d 441.
Corporate officer is employee. — Corporate officer not in fact sole owner of the corporation and performing nonexecutive work ordinarily performed by employees is generally held to be an employee covered by the act, notwithstanding the corporate office held by him. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.
Corporate officer injured performing duty of employees. — A corporate officer may be considered an employee under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, particularly when he is injured while performing a duty which was ordinarily done by employees. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.
IV. COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Meaning of "date when the compensable injury manifests itself" or "date when the workman [worker] knows or should know he has suffered a compensable injury" is applicable to all of the portions of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act where the terms "time of accident," "time of injury," "date of disability," "date of accidental injury," or words of similar import are used, recognizing the reality of possible latent injuries and that payment of compensation is a partial substitute for wages formerly earned by the workman [worker] at the time when he can no longer earn the same wage. Casias v. Zia Co., 1979-NMCA-068, 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203.
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS.
Lack of jurisdiction at any stage of proceeding is controlling consideration to be resolved before going further. Baker v. Shufflebarger & Assocs., 1966-NMSC-189, 77 N.M. 50, 419 P.2d 250, overruled in part on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Federal court jurisdictional minimum met where right to all payments in issue. — A possibility that payments of workmen's [workers'] compensation benefits will terminate before the total reaches the jurisdictional minimum necessary for the federal district court to entertain the case after removal is immaterial if the right to all the payments is in issue, since future payments under the act are not in any proper sense contingent, although they may be decreased or cut off altogether by the operation of conditions subsequent. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).
In the nature of civil complaints, workmen's [workers'] compensation cases are not civil actions but are sui generis. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-NMSC-186, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504.
Conventional methods of administration of justice employed. — The New Mexico Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act may be classified as one of the "judicial" acts, whereby the workmen's [workers'] compensation claim in the first instance is filed in a court of record in a district court of the state, process issued by said court and a trial of the cause had, either before the district judge without a jury, or with a jury; there are certain differences in the procedure between a workmen's [workers'] compensation case and the ordinary damage case. But at the same time, from an overall standpoint, the conventional methods of administration of justice are employed in workmen's [workers'] compensation cases. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).
Disqualification of judge statute applicable to compensation claims. — Provision of statute for the disqualification of a judge by a party to any action or proceeding is applicable to claims prosecuted under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. State ex rel. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Arledge, 1950-NMSC-039, 54 N.M. 267, 221 P.2d 562.
Nothing inconsistent in applying general rules covering jury trials to workmen's [workers'] compensation cases. Bryant v. H.B. Lynn Drilling Corp., 1959-NMSC-001, 65 N.M. 177, 334 P.2d 707.
Limitations under this act commence to run from time of employer's failure to pay compensation for a disability when the disability can be ascertained and duty to compensate arises rather than from the date of the accident. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873.
Claim not too late where employer's doctor indicated injury minor. — Where at time of injury employee was led to believe by employer's doctor that injury was minor and attributed eye weakness to advancing age and natural causes, employee's claim for compensation filed within statutory time after discovery of seriousness of the injury more than two years after the accident was not too late. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873.
Special interrogatory should cover both requisites to right to compensation set forth in Section 52-1-9 NMSA 1978: whether employee was performing services arising out of and in course of his employment at time of the accident, and whether the employee's death was proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment. Sw. Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1943).
No provision made for special interrogatories. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act gives the right of trial by jury to either party but makes no provision for special interrogatories. However, to submit special interrogatories without a general verdict unless the latter is waived or consented to is reversible error. Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque, 1959-NMSC-036, 65 N.M. 379, 338 P.2d 110.
A motion for dismissal is in order where claim shows that the defendant was not at time of employee's death engaged in an extra-hazardous business covered under the act. Hernandez v. Border Truck Line, 1946-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 396, 165 P.2d 120 (decided under former law).
No summary judgment for claims filed prior to Laws 1959. — A workmen's [workers'] compensation claim filed prior to the effective date of Laws 1959, ch. 67, may not be disposed of on summary judgment. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co., 1962-NMSC-063, 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605 (decided under former law).
Motion for summary judgment erroneously granted where evidence showed not special employee. — Trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment in personal injury suit on grounds that appellant, a welder sent to appellee's premises by his regular employer, was a special employee and thus was barred from further recovery by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, where testimony of appellant disclosed that the work he was engaged in at the time of the accident was in the usual performance of his duties and that if any of appellee's agents had given him instructions contrary to those of his regular employer he would not have followed them. Such evidence, if not contradicted by other evidence to be offered in the trial thereafter ordered, would have required the conclusion that appellant was employed solely by his regular employer and was not prevented by the act from recovery from appellee. Davison v. Tom Brown Drilling Co., 1966-NMSC-115, 76 N.M. 412, 415 P.2d 541.
Right to remove to federal court not waived by electing state compensation. — The claimant's argument that the employer elected to be governed by the laws of New Mexico, by having sought the protection afforded by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act and thus should not be able to remove a case thereunder to a federal forum was without merit since a state cannot constitutionally provide, by statute, an instrumentality whereby the right to remove a case to a federal tribunal can be waived. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).
In order to make out case calling for directed verdict for employer, one is compelled to weigh the evidence and draw inferences against the verdict, which should be resolved in favor of the verdict for the employee. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.
In compensation case, evidence of pecuniary circumstances of parties is incompetent. Hamilton v. Doty, 1958-NMSC-139, 65 N.M. 270, 335 P.2d 1067.
Where evidence before trial court conflicted as to causal connection between accident and death, it was for the trial court to resolve the disagreement. Mayfield v. Keeth Gas Co., 1970-NMCA-032, 81 N.M. 313, 466 P.2d 879.
Admission of evidence of strenuous training course. — Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony relating to strenuousness of training course decedent was taking at the time of his death, offered by employee who had taken the course under sufficiently similar circumstances and conditions. Brown v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 1962-NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.
Admission of self-serving declaration of deceased workman [worker]. — While recognizing the trend toward a greater admissibility of declarations of deceased persons where the same information cannot be obtained in a more purified or authentic form, the self-serving declarations of a decedent in a workmen's [workers'] compensation case will not be admitted on the ground of necessity alone even though it was the only available evidence bearing on the issue. Brown v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 1962-NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.
Causal connection between false statement and injury. — There was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's determination of a causal connection between the claimant's false representation on her employment application and her subsequent injury, in the form of the claimant's physical impairment rating and the respondent's expert testimony that the claimant was at an increased risk due to her prior undisclosed injury. Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 1988-NMCA-076, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82.
Effect of false representation on application for employment. — A claimant who knowingly and willfully made false representations on his application for employment regarding past employment, and who failed to reveal his prior history of a work-related injury was barred from receiving compensation benefits. Sanchez v. Memorial Gen. Hosp., 1990-NMCA-095, 110 N.M. 683, 798 P.2d 1069, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653, 798 P.2d 1039.
Jury to accept or reject expert's testimony. — Medical testimony, as other expert evidence, is intended to aid, but not to conclude, a court or jury. "The jury is entitled to rely upon rational inferences deductible from the evidence, whether arising from expert testimony or otherwise." It is within the province of the jury to accept or reject expert surgeon's testimony. Seay v. Lea Cnty. Sand & Gravel Co., 1956-NMSC-004, 60 N.M. 399, 292 P.2d 93.
The jury is privileged to accept, reject or give such weight to the testimony of expert witnesses only, as it deemed the same entitled to have. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.
Jury inference regarding heart attack proper. — Jury inference that an unusual strain on decedent's heart, helped along by difficulty in breathing caused by fumes from testing a new process, invoked a heart attack and death is proper. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.
Evidence supported giving issue to jury. — That claimant suffered an emotional upset at his office, related to his work, three hours before the stroke, coupled with medical testimony that fatigue and emotional upsets hasten the precipitation of a fatal incident in an individual with essential hypertension, and that there was "a strong probability of connection" between these factors and decedent's cerebral hemorrhage, refute a contention that "the jury should not have been permitted to speculate upon the issue." Salazar v. County of Bernalillo, 1962-NMSC-014, 69 N.M. 464, 368 P.2d 141.
Jury question whether causal connection between accident and disability. — Even where no positive statement can be made as to the causal connection by medical witnesses, court was correct in sending the case to the jury on the basis of the medical testimony, such as it was, and the lay testimony as to the events surrounding the accident both before and after it happened, as it was for jury determination as to whether there was a natural sequence of events which indicate a causal connection between work accident and disability sustained. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled on other grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.
Claimant has burden of proving compensable accident. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.
Failure of court to find fact as finding against party with burden. — Even if omissions were made, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that a failure by the trial court to find a material fact must be regarded as a finding against the party having the burden of establishing such fact. Baker v. Shufflebarger & Assocs., Inc., 1966-NMSC-189, 77 N.M. 50, 419 P.2d 250.
No attack on findings where no objection on requested findings. — Where workmen's [workers'] compensation proceeding's findings were not objected to and no requested findings were timely made under Rule 52(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now Paragraph B of Rule 1-052 NMRA), the court's findings could not be attacked. Gillit v. Theatre Enters., Inc., 1962-NMSC-141, 71 N.M. 31, 375 P.2d 580.
No denial of appeal right where accepted less compensation than entitled. — Under Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Law, a workman [worker] cannot be denied the right of appeal by his acceptance of a compensation award in an amount less than that to which he is entitled. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958).
After notice of appeal from judgment in workman [worker's] compensation case was filed, trial court lost jurisdiction of the cause and acted properly in refusing to set aside its judgment. Ledbetter v. Lanham Constr. Co., 1966-NMSC-058, 76 N.M. 132, 412 P.2d 559.
Prejudgment interest. — Section 56-8-4D NMSA 1978 contains an express exemption for the state from awards of prejudgment interest in favor of an injured worker in a workers' compensation action. Montney v. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't, 1989-NMCA-002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 769 P.2d 731.
Only favorable evidence considered on appeal. — On appeal in compensation hearing only that evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the findings will be considered. All evidence unfavorable to the findings will be disregarded. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775.
Not weighing conflicting evidence or credibility of witnesses. — In reviewing workmen's [workers'] compensation cases, court of appeals considers only evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to support the findings, and will not weigh conflicting evidence or credibility of the witnesses. Lopez v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 1972-NMCA-079, 83 N.M. 799, 498 P.2d 686.
Voluntary payment of compensation benefits is merely competent evidence as to any issue in a workman's [worker's] compensation suit and does not create any presumptions or shifts in the original burden. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743; but see Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212; Medrano v. Ray Willis Constr. Co., 1981-NMCA-096, 96 N.M. 643, 633 P.2d 1241.
Employer's voluntary payment of employee's benefits admission of accident. — By voluntarily paying an injured employee workmen's [workers'] compensation benefits, the employer admits that the employee's disability was a natural and direct result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and relieves plaintiffs of the burden of establishing any causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212; but see Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.
Claimant's testimony as only evidence supporting trial court's finding remains undisturbed on appeal. — Where claimant's testimony is the only evidence which has a bearing on the cause of the accident and if her statement will support the trial court's finding that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, the finding shall not be disturbed on appeal. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.
Supreme court will not disturb findings where substantial evidence. — It is clear that in workmen's [workers'] compensation cases, as in other appeals, where substantial evidence is present to support a finding, the supreme court will not disturb the same on appeal. Yates v. Matthews, 1963-NMSC-038, 71 N.M. 451, 379 P.2d 441.
Judgment not reversed though rule erroneously applied where evidence substantial. — A workmen's [workers'] compensation case which presented a question concerning traumatic neurosis required an extra-cautious view of the evidence, but when the trial court construed the evidence in a manner more favorable to the claimant, its judgment was not to be reversed even though an erroneous rule may have been applied to the weight to be given the evidence, because the evidence in that case substantially supported the findings without applying the erroneous rule. Jensen v. United Perlite Corp., 1966-NMSC-111, 76 N.M. 384, 415 P.2d 356, overruled on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Public officers not entitled to benefits. — Prior to 1972, members of the New Mexico state labor and industrial commission, the state fair commission, the racing commission and the livestock board, were all public officers, not employees, and not entitled to benefits under this act. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-109 (rendered under former law).
Law reviews. — For note, "Workmen's Compensation in New Mexico: Pre-existing Conditions and the Subsequent Injury Act," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 632 (1967).
For comment on Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1967), see 8 Nat. Resources J. 522 (1968).
For survey, "Workmen's Compensation," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 413 (1976).
For note, "Medical Benefits Awarded to an Illegal Alien: Perez v. Health and Social Services," see 9 N.M. L. Rev. 89 (1978-79).
For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Torts," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (1981).
For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Workmen's Compensation," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 235 (1981).
For note, "Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: The Duty of an Employer to Provide a Safe Place to Work for the Employee of an Independent Contractor," see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 559 (1982).
For article, "Survey on New Mexico Law, 1982-83: Workmen's Compensation," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 211 (1984).
For comment, "Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits Out of Worker's Partial Third-Party Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc.," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 437 (1984).
For comment, "A Comparison of Workers' Compensation in the United States and Mexico," see 26 N.M.L. Rev. 133 (1996).
For article, "The Role of the Vocational Expert in Worker's Compensation Cases," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 483 (1984).
For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 579 (1988).
For case note, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: A Clinical Psychologist is Qualified to Give Expert Medical Testimony Regarding Causation: Madrid v. Univ. of California, d/b/a Los Alamos National Laboratory," see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 637 (1988).
For 1984-88 survey of New Mexico administrative law, 19 N.M.L. Rev. 575 (1990).
For annual survey of New Mexico Workers' Compensation Law, see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 459 (1990).
For note, "Workers' Compensation Law - Bad Faith Refusal of an Insurer To Pay Workers' Compensation Benefits: Russell v. Protective Insurance Company," see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 757 (1990).
For note, "The Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers' Compensation as an Inadequate and Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge," see 24 N.M.L. Rev. 565.
For note, "Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Holds Worker's Compensation Premiums Are Not Entitled to Fringe Benefits Priority Status - In Re S. Star Foods, Inc.," see 28 N.M.L. Rev. 487 (1998).
For comment, "A Comparison of Workers' Compensation in the United States and Mexico," see 26 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1996).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation §§ 1, 4.
Workmen's compensation as insurance, 119 A.L.R. 1245.
Application for, or award, denial or acceptance of, compensation under State Workmen's Compensation Act as precluding action under Federal Employers Liability Act by one engaged in interstate commerce within that act, 6 A.L.R.2d 581.
Workmen's compensation benefits, voluntarily paid under statute of one state, as bar to claim or ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state, 8 A.L.R.2d 628.
Master's liability for failure to inform servant of disease or physical condition disclosed by medical examination, 69 A.L.R.2d 1213.
Right of employee to maintain common-law action for negligence against workmen's compensation insurance carrier, 93 A.L.R.2d 598.
Unemployment compensation benefits applied for or received as affecting claim for workmen's compensation, 96 A.L.R.2d 941.
Right to maintain malpractice suit against injured employee's attending physician notwithstanding receipt of workmen's compensation award, 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.
Insured's receipt of or right to workmen's compensation benefits as affecting recovery under accident, hospital or medical expense policy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1012.
Homeowners' or personal liability insurance as providing coverage for liability under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 A.L.R.3d 1306.
Automobile insurance, exclusion of employees of insured covered by workmen's compensation, 45 A.L.R.3d 288.
Modern status of effect of Workmen's Compensation Act on right of third person tortfeasor to recover contribution from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350.
Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.
Workers' compensation: liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments, 34 A.L.R.4th 958.
Third-party tortfeasor's right to have damages recovered by employee reduced by amount of employee's workers' compensation benefits, 43 A.L.R.4th 849.
Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of co-employee as ground of liability despite bar of workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888.
Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers' compensation purposes, 78 A.L.R.4th 973.
Workers' Compensation: Compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 A.L.R.4th 110.
Eligibility for workers' compensation as affected by claimant's misrepresentation of health or physical condition at time of hiring, 12 A.L.R.5th 658.
Validity, construction and application of workers' compensation provisions relating to nonresident alien dependents, 28 A.L.R.5th 547.
Divorce and separation: workers' compensation benefits as marital property subject to distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139.
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: validity, construction and effect of policy provision purporting to reduce coverage by amount paid or payable under workers' compensation law, 31 A.L.R.5th 116.
Collateral source rule: admissibility of evidence of availability to plaintiff of free public special education on issue of amount of damages recoverable from defendant, 41 A.L.R.5th 771.
Violation of employment rule barring claim for worker's compensation, 61 A.L.R.5th 375.
Workers' compensation: availability, rate, or method of calculation of interest on attorney's fees or penalties, 79 A.L.R.5th 201.
Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 97 A.L.R.5th 1.
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1.

Structure New Mexico Statutes