Georgia Code
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 17-6-1. [Effective Until July 1, 2023. See note.] When Offenses Bailable; Procedure; Schedule of Bails; Appeal Bonds

(5.1) Home invasion in the first degree;
History. Orig. Code 1863, § 4625; Code 1868, § 4649; Code 1873, § 4747; Code 1882, § 4747; Penal Code 1895, § 933; Penal Code 1910, § 958; Ga. L. 1922, p. 51, § 1; Code 1933, § 27-901; Ga. L. 1973, p. 454, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1359, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 910, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 14; Ga. L. 1983, p. 358, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 452, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 17; Ga. L. 1984, p. 679, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 760, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 416, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 166, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 358, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1714, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 17; Ga. L. 1991, p. 416, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1401, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1150, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2527, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 91, § 17; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1534, § 2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 532, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1270, § .5; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1625, § 5; Ga. L. 1995, p. 379, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1995, p. 989, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1233, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1624, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 17; Ga. L. 1998, p. 270, § 9; Ga. L. 1999, p. 391, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1171, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 18/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2008, p. 817, § 1/HB 960; Ga. L. 2010, p. 226, § 1/HB 889; Ga. L. 2010, p. 230, §§ 8, 9/HB 1015; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 8-8/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 667, § 3/SB 86; Ga. L. 2014, p. 426, § 9/HB 770; Ga. L. 2017, p. 417, § 2-1/SB 104; Ga. L. 2018, p. 550, § 2-4/SB 407; Ga. L. 2020, p. 570, § 2-1/SB 402; Ga. L. 2021, p. 461, § 1/SB 174; Ga. L. 2021, p. 625, § 4/HB 479; Ga. L. 2022, p. 402, § 1/SB 461.
Delayed effective date.
Code Section 17-6-1 is set out twice in this Code. This version is effective until July 1, 2023. For version effective July 1, 2023, see the following version.
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in paragraph (b)(1), inserted “inclusive of offenses that are violations of local ordinances,” in the middle of the first sentence, and added the third sentence; designated the existing provisions of the introductory paragraph of subsection (e) as paragraph (e)(1); redesignated former paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) as present subparagraphs (e)(1)(A) through (e)(1)(D), respectively; added paragraph (e)(2); designated the ending undesignated paragraph of subsection (e) as paragraph (e)(3); substituted “However, if” for “If” in present paragraph (e)(3); substituted “an accused” for “a person charged with committing any offense” in the middle of paragraph (f)(1); substituted “bail or other release from custody shall be set by a judge on an individual basis and a schedule of bails provided for in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be utilized; provided, however, that the judge” for “the schedule of bails provided for in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall require increased bail and” near the middle of paragraph (f)(2); in paragraph (f)(3), in the first sentence, deleted “the schedule of bails and” following “determine whether”, and deleted “of its” preceding “specific conditions”; in paragraph (f)(4), substituted “accused” for “defendant” twice, and substituted “an alleged victim” for “a victim” in the middle; in subsection (i), deleted “the” following “shall include” in the middle, and deleted “the provisions of” preceding “Code Section 17-6-12”.
The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, added paragraphs (e)(4) and (e)(5) and, in subsection (i), substituted “the release” for “releasing” and substituted “an unsecured judicial release” for “such person’s own recognizance”.
The 2021 amendments.
The first 2021 amendment, effective May 4, 2021, in paragraph (e)(4), substituted “A bond set for any offense” for “Any bond issued” at the beginning, and inserted “, an appointed judge filling the vacancy of an elected judge,” near the middle. The second 2021 amendment, effective May 10, 2021, deleted “or 17-4-62” following “Code Section 17-4-26” in the first sentence of paragraph (c)(1). See Editor’s notes for applicability.
The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2022, deleted “and” from the end of paragraph (a)(12), added paragraph (a)(13), and redesignated former paragraph (a)(13) as present paragraph (a)(14).
Cross references.
Bail in magistrate court criminal cases, Uniform Rules for the Magistrate Courts, Rule 23.
Code Commission notes.
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, “six” was substituted for “6” in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) (now subparagraph (b)(2)(A)).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1995, paragraph (11) of subsection (a), as enacted by Ga. L. 1995, p. 989, § 1, was redesignated as paragraph (12) of subsection (a), owing to the use of a duplicate paragraph designation by Ga. L. 1995, p. 379, § 1.
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2010, “Chapter 15 of Title 16” was substituted for “the ‘Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act’ ” in paragraph (a)(13).
Editor’s notes.
Ga. L. 1986, p. 166, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would become effective July 1, 1986, and would apply to prosecutions commenced on or after that date.
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1625, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Anti-motor Vehicle Hijacking Act of 1994’ ”.
Ga. L. 1995, p. 379, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall apply to all bail hearings held on or after July 1, 1995, without regard to whether the offense was committed prior to, on, or after July 1, 1995, and without regard to whether an underlying prior conviction occurred prior to, on, or after July 1, 1995.
Ga. L. 1995, p. 989, § 3, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that act shall apply to acts committed on or after July 1, 1995.
Ga. L. 1999, p. 391, §§ 1 and 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides in part that the memory of all victims of drunken driving and Heidi Marie Flye, Cathryn Nicole Flye, and Audrey Marie Flye should be honored and that this Act shall be known and may be cited as “Heidi’s Law”.
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:
“(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;
“(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;
“(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;
“(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;
“(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and
“(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.
“The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender’s presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender.”
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.”
Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act.”
Ga. L. 2021, p. 625, § 8/HB479, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that: “This Act shall not apply to rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, or proceedings that were begun before the effective date of this Act.” This Act became effective May 10, 2021.
Law reviews.
For comment on Ingram v. Grimes, 213 Ga. 652 , 100 S.E.2d 914 (1957), holding that the granting of bail after conviction rests on the discretion of the trial court even when a motion for new trial is pending, see 21 Ga. B.J. 235 (1958).
For note, “Bail in Georgia: Elimination of ‘Double Bonding’ — A Partially Solved Problem,” see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 220 (1971).
For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986).
For note, “The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State Preventive Detention Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 805 (1988).
For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 216 (1989).
For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 43 (1992).
For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 129 (1992).
For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 95 (1993).
For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 99 (1994).
For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 129 (1994).
For note on the 1995 amendment of this Code section, see 12 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 141 (1995).
For review of 1998 legislation relating to crimes and offenses, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 80 (1998).
For note on 1999 amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 200 (1999).
For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006).
For survey article on criminal law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (2007).
For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 290 (2012).
For note, “Give It to Me, I’m Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia’s Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).
For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 61 (2017).
For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017).
For note, “Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail Systems and Their Continued Use Throughout the United States,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 985 (2018).
For article on the 2018 amendment of this Code section, see 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 45 (2018).
For note, “A ‘Critical’ Question of State Law: Georgia’s Ambiguous Treatment of Initial Appearance Hearings and the Implications of Bail Reform,” see 54 Ga. L. Rev. 363 (2019).
For article, “HB 479: Repeal of Georgia’s Citizen’s Arrest Law,” see 38 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 25 (2021).
For article, “SB 174: Revising Georgia’s List of Bail Restricted Offenses,” see 38 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 41 (2021).