New York Laws
Article 30 - Timeliness of Prosecutions and Speedy Trial
30.30 - Speedy Trial; Time Limitations.

(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months and none of which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
three months and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months; or
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
(e) for the purposes of this subdivision, the term offense shall
include vehicle and traffic law infractions.
2. Except as provided in subdivision three of this section, where a
defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff or the office
of children and family services in a criminal action he or she must be
released on bail or on his or her own recognizance, upon such conditions
as may be just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in
that criminal action within:
(a) ninety days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the
custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in
a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more
offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
(b) thirty days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the
custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in
a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more
offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a
sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is
a felony;
(c) fifteen days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the
custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in
a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more
offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a
sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none of which
is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months; or
(d) five days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the
custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in
a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more
offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of which is a
crime.
(e) for the purposes of this subdivision, the term offense shall
include vehicle and traffic law infractions.
3. (a) Subdivisions one and two of this section do not apply to a
criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined
in sections 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the
penal law.
(b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two of this section
upon expiration of the specified period may be denied where the people

are not ready for trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the
expiration of the specified period and their present unreadiness is due
to some exceptional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,
the sudden unavailability of evidence material to the people's case,
when the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such
evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence
will become available in a reasonable period.
(c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two of this section shall
not:
(i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
another offense;
(ii) require the release from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another criminal charge as to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
(iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from custody pursuant to this section or
otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial
proceeding at which his presence is required or otherwise.
4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for
trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two of this section, the
following periods must be excluded:
(a) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by the court;
or
(b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or
her counsel. The court may grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into
account the public interest in the prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A defendant without counsel must not be deemed to have
consented to a continuance unless he or she has been advised by the
court of his or her rights under these rules and the effect of his
consent, which must be done on the record in open court; or
(c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent
whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due
diligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his
location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence; or
(ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day the court issues a
bench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 of this chapter because of the
defendant's failure to appear in court when required, to the day the
defendant subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant
or voluntarily or otherwise; or
(d) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section has not run and good cause is not shown for granting a
severance; or
(e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
another jurisdiction provided the district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent and has made reasonable efforts to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
(f) the period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
(g) other periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence
material to the people's case, when the district attorney has exercised
due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds
to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable
period; or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district
attorney additional time to prepare the people's case and additional
time is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case. Any such
exclusion when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness made by the people must be evaluated by the court after
inquiry on the record as to the reasons for the people's unreadiness and
shall only be approved upon a showing of sufficient supporting facts; or
(h) the period during which an action has been adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and
215.10 of this chapter; or
(i) the period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for
arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10 of this chapter; or
(j) the period during which a family offense is before a family court
until such time as an accusatory instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
5. Whenever pursuant to this section a prosecutor states or otherwise
provides notice that the people are ready for trial, the court shall
make inquiry on the record as to their actual readiness. If, after
conducting its inquiry, the court determines that the people are not
ready to proceed to trial, the prosecutor's statement or notice of
readiness shall not be valid for purposes of this section. Any statement
of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of
good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20
of this chapter and the defense shall be afforded an opportunity to be
heard on the record as to whether the disclosure requirements have been
met. This subdivision shall not apply to cases where the defense has
waived disclosure requirements.
5-a. Upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, a statement of
readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies
that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the
requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those
counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of
this chapter have been dismissed.
6. An order finally denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to
subdivision one of this section shall be reviewable upon an appeal from
an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such
judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty.
7. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or
collateral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to the custody

of the sheriff or the office of children and family services, if any,
must be deemed to have commenced on the date the withdrawal of the plea
of guilty or the date the order occasioning a retrial becomes final;
(b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the
ticket;
(c) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article one hundred eighty of this chapter or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to section 190.70 of this chapter, the
period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one must be the period
applicable to the charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated
from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,
however, that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,
excluding the periods provided in subdivision four, already elapsed from
the date of the filing of the felony complaint to the date of the filing
of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period
applicable to the charges in the felony complaint must remain applicable
and continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(d) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article one hundred eighty of this chapter or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to section 190.70 of this chapter, the
period applicable for the purposes of subdivision two of this section
must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new
accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new
accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the
charges in the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as
if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
(e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20 of this chapter, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision one of this section must be the period applicable to the
charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of
the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that
when the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the
periods provided in subdivision four of this section, already elapsed
from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the filing
of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period
applicable to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and
continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20 of this chapter, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision two of this section must be the period applicable to the
charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of
the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that

when the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the
periods provided in subdivision four of this section, already elapsed
from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the filing
of the new accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period
applicable to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and
continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
8. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through seven
of section 210.45 of this chapter with respect to a motion to dismiss an
indictment are not applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision
two of this section. If, upon oral argument, a time period is in
dispute, the court must promptly conduct a hearing in which the people
must prove that the time period is excludable.