New York Laws
Article 30 - Timeliness of Prosecutions and Speedy Trial
30.10 - Timeliness of Prosecutions; Periods of Limitation.

(a) A prosecution for a class A felony, or rape in the first degree as
defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, or a crime defined or
formerly defined in section 130.50 of the penal law, or aggravated
sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.70 of the
penal law, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first
degree as defined in section 130.75 of the penal law, or incest in the
first degree as defined in section 255.27 of the penal law may be
commenced at any time;
(a-1) A prosecution for rape in the second degree as defined in
subdivision two of section 130.30 of the penal law, or criminal sexual
act in the second degree as defined in subdivision two of section 130.45
of the penal law, or incest in the second degree as defined in section
255.26 of the penal law (where the crime committed is rape in the second
degree as defined in subdivision two of section 130.30 of the penal law
or criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in subdivision
two of section 130.45) must be commenced within twenty years after the
commission thereof or within ten years from when the offense is first
reported to law enforcement, whichever occurs earlier;
(a-2) A prosecution for rape in the third degree as defined in
subdivision one or three of section 130.25 of the penal law, or criminal
sexual act in the third degree as defined in subdivision one or three of
section 130.40 of the penal law must be commenced within ten years after
the commission thereof;
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within five
years after the commission thereof;
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years
after the commission thereof;
(d) A prosecution for a petty offense must be commenced within one
year after the commission thereof.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, the periods of
limitation for the commencement of criminal actions are extended as
follows in the indicated circumstances:
(a) A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in violation of a
fiduciary duty may be commenced within one year after the facts
constituting such offense are discovered or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by the aggrieved party
or by a person under a legal duty to represent him who is not himself
implicated in the commission of the offense.
(b) A prosecution for any offense involving misconduct in public
office by a public servant including, without limitation, an offense
defined in article four hundred ninety-six of the penal law, may be
commenced against a public servant, or any other person acting in
concert with such public servant at any time during such public
servant's service in such office or within five years after the
termination of such service; provided however, that in no event shall
the period of limitation be extended by more than five years beyond the
period otherwise applicable under subdivision two of this section.
(c) A prosecution for any crime set forth in title twenty-seven or
article seventy-one of the environmental conservation law may be
commenced within four years after the facts constituting such crime are
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been
discovered by a public servant who has the responsibility to enforce the
provisions of said title and article.
(d) A prosecution for any misdemeanor set forth in the tax law or
chapter forty-six of the administrative code of the city of New York
must be commenced within three years after the commission thereof.
(e) A prosecution for course of sexual conduct against a child in the
second degree as defined in section 130.80 of the penal law may be
commenced within five years of the commission of the most recent act of
sexual conduct.
(f) For purposes of a prosecution involving a sexual offense as
defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law, other than a
sexual offense delineated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this
section, committed against a child less than eighteen years of age,
incest in the first, second or third degree as defined in sections
255.27, 255.26 and 255.25 of the penal law committed against a child
less than eighteen years of age, or use of a child in a sexual
performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law, the period of
limitation shall not begin to run until the child has reached the age of
twenty-three or the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency or
statewide central register of child abuse and maltreatment, whichever
occurs earlier.
(g) A prosecution for any felony defined in article four hundred
ninety of the penal law must be commenced within eight years after the
commission thereof provided, however, that in a prosecution for a felony
defined in article four hundred ninety of the penal law, if the
commission of such felony offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable
risk of, death or serious physical injury to another person, the
prosecution may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that
nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to shorten or otherwise lessen
the period, defined in any other applicable law, in which a prosecution
for a felony designated in this paragraph may be commenced.
4. In calculating the time limitation applicable to commencement of a
criminal action, the following periods shall not be included:
(a) Any period following the commission of the offense during which
(i) the defendant was continuously outside this state or (ii) the
whereabouts of the defendant were continuously unknown and continuously
unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence. However, in no
event shall the period of limitation be extended by more than five years
beyond the period otherwise applicable under subdivision two.
(b) When a prosecution for an offense is lawfully commenced within the
prescribed period of limitation therefor, and when an accusatory
instrument upon which such prosecution is based is subsequently
dismissed by an authorized court under directions or circumstances
permitting the lodging of another charge for the same offense or an
offense based on the same conduct, the period extending from the
commencement of the thus defeated prosecution to the dismissal of the
accusatory instrument does not constitute a part of the period of
limitation applicable to commencement of prosecution by a new charge.