Connecticut General Statutes
Chapter 439 - Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. State Policy
Section 22a-16. - Action for declaratory and equitable relief against unreasonable pollution.

The Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is located, resides or conducts business, except that where the state is the defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district of Hartford, for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction provided no such action shall be maintained against the state for pollution of real property acquired by the state under subsection (e) of section 22a-133m, where the spill or discharge which caused the pollution occurred prior to the acquisition of the property by the state.

(1971, P.A. 96, S. 3; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 6, 127; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; 93-428, S. 31, 39; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)
History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county” and “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” for “Hartford county”; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 93-428 provided that no action could be maintained under this section for certain properties acquired by the state pursuant to Sec. 22a-133m, the urban sites remediation program, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.
Cited. 170 C. 47; 175 C. 483; 179 C. 541; 184 C. 51; 192 C. 247. Section did not provide plaintiffs with standing under any statute other than the Environmental Protection Act itself. Id., 591. Cited. 197 C. 134; 204 C. 38; Id., 212; 212 C. 710; Id., 727; 215 C. 474; 218 C. 580; 220 C. 54; 222 C. 98; Id., 280; 226 C. 205; Id., 579; 227 C. 175; 229 C. 479; 234 C. 488; 237 C. 135; 239 C. 786. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring action pursuant to section and litigate permitting claims that are governed by Sec. 22a-430 and are within exclusive domain of department. 254 C. 21. All that is required to invoke jurisdiction of Superior Court under section is a colorable claim by “any person” against “any person” of conduct resulting in harm to one or more natural resources of this state and in this case, plaintiff has standing under section but has not alleged factual allegations sufficient to support plaintiff's claims against defendant because section does not expand jurisdiction of the town agency to consider environmental matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction; plaintiff's claim against city based on a statutory duty is within scope of statute; plaintiff also has standing against permit applicant on grounds that its proposed demolition activities will result in unreasonable harm to state's natural resources. 262 C. 480. Plaintiff failed to establish statutory standing under section because plaintiff's complaint fell short of articulating a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment. 265 C. 423. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring action pursuant to section where the area in question is expressly placed within exclusive domain of commissioner. 267 C. 116. Trial court properly determined airport defendants should not be required to restore land to its original condition and properly determined amount of monetary penalties. 275 C. 105. Commissioner had standing to make claim that clear-cutting of trees by airport defendant constituted unreasonable pollution. Id., 161. Plaintiff made a colorable claim of unreasonable harm to the environment sufficient to establish standing to seek relief; action should have been brought in judicial district of Hartford, but plaintiff's failure to do so did not implicate trial court's subject matter jurisdiction; the case should be transferred to judicial district of Hartford. 282 C. 791. Section authorizes “any person” to bring an action for enforcement of provisions and plaintiffs had standing to bring action upon allegation that development had resulted in destruction of wetlands and was likely to cause irreparable harm to surrounding ecosystem and watercourses. 284 C. 268. Plaintiff has standing under section to claim that existing permit renewal process is inadequate to protect rights recognized by Environmental Protection Act. 291 C. 789. Plaintiff failed to establish standing under section because complaint re increased power generation at nuclear power station did not allege substantive violations giving rise to unreasonable pollution. 300 C. 542. Issuance of a renewal permit did not render present action moot because it did not resolve or terminate the controversies because the trial court could determine that the permit renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect against unreasonable pollution. 323 C. 668.
Cited. 4 CA 621; 30 CA 204; 40 CA 75; 41 CA 89; Id., 120. Wetlands constitute a natural resource of this state and the purpose for enacting section was to prevent their unreasonable “pollution, impairment or destruction”; plaintiff had standing to bring action pursuant to section where complaint alleged defendant developer's construction activities were unlawfully impairing or destroying wetlands because of failure to follow procedures established by Sec. 22a-42a(b) and inland wetland regulations. 49 CA 684. Section imposed a standard of care on defendants, the violation of which constituted negligence per se, because plaintiff, who alleged damage to his pond caused by erosion, turbidity and siltation from nonfunctioning erosion and sediment control measures, was within the class of persons protected by section and the alleged injury is of the type section intended to prevent. 122 CA 555. Plaintiff could not prevail on claim that trial court improperly relied on Sec. 26-92 governing wild birds as the standard for determining whether defendant's conduct was an unreasonable impairment because Sec. 26-92 addresses the parakeets by name, identifies when they are exempt from protections, governs the conduct in question and provides the standard by which the court is to judge the evidence. 124 CA 823. Although plaintiff does not facially challenge the validity of permit to run cooling system for nuclear power plant on environmental grounds, that is the essence of her claim, and the court properly concluded that plaintiff did not have standing to pursue her claim under the act. 129 CA 203. The mere allegation that defendant has failed to comply with a certain technical or procedural requirement of a statute imposing environmental standards does not, in and of itself, give rise to a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution under section. 140 CA 155.
Commissioner does not have right to act directly under statute to seek declaratory or equitable relief; he is limited under Inland Wetlands and Water Courses Act to promulgating regulations and appealing decisions of municipal commissions. 35 CS 145. Section is example of a legislative enactment of what has been described as expanding doctrine of “private attorney generals”, who are empowered to institute proceedings to vindicate the public interest; by utilizing this procedure, legislature expanded the number of potential guardians of the public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on limited resources of a particular agency. 48 CS 594. Plaintiff cannot claim standing under section on the basis that there are now and will be mandatory plans for the development of the property when the complaint sets forth no allegations of proposed or adopted plans for such future development. 51 CS 590.

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