New Mexico Statutes
Article 46 - Suits by and Against Counties
Section 4-46-1 - [Name for purpose of suit.]

In all suits or proceedings by or against a county, the name in which the county shall sue or be sued shall be the board of county commissioners of the county of . . . . . . . . . ., but this provision shall not prohibit county officers, when authorized by law, from suing in their name of office for the benefit of the county.
History: Laws 1876, ch. 1, § 4; C.L. 1884, § 335; C.L. 1897, § 654; Code 1915, § 1152; C.S. 1929, § 33-3701; 1941 Comp., § 15-4301; 1953 Comp., § 15-45-1.
Cross references. — For the Tort Claims Act, see 41-4-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
Lawsuit alleging claims against county detention center must name board of county commissioners as a defendant. — Where plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting claims against the Bernalillo county metropolitan detention center (BCMDC) for violations of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) after plaintiff was remanded to BCMDC to participate in a methadone program to decrease his level of dependence so that he would not incur life endangering withdrawal symptoms, but nonetheless suffered life threatening withdrawal symptoms for approximately two months, BCMDC was not a suable entity under the NMTCA, because 4-46-1 NMSA 1978 provides a limitation on the NMTCA, requiring that the proper defendant in all suits against a county is the county's board of county commissioners. Gallegos v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners, 272 F.Supp.3d 1256 (D.N.M. 2017).
County sheriff lacks the capacity to be sued, even under federal statutes. — Where former New Mexico county sheriff's office employee brought a court action against the Taos county sheriff's office alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act, the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as a state law claim for retaliatory termination against public policy, and where defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the basis that the Taos county sheriff's office is not a suable entity, the federal district court granted defendant's motion because a straightforward application of this section suggests that plaintiff must name the board of county commissioners of Taos county, rather than the Taos county sheriff's office, as the defendant in this case. Moreover, despite the authority of elected officials such as the Taos county sheriff, the board of county commissioners, through the county manager, was authorized and empowered to establish by ordinance a merit system for the hiring, promotion, discharge and general regulation of the deputies and the employees of the county sheriff's office. Lamendola v. Taos County Sheriff's Office, 338 F.Supp.3d 1244 (D. N.M. 2018).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 786, 791.
Abrogation of state's immunity from liability of suit as affecting immunity of county, 161 A.L.R. 367.
Power of county or its officials to compromise claim, 15 A.L.R.2d 1359.
Liability of county for torts in connection with activities which pertain, or are claimed to pertain, to private or proprietary function, 16 A.L.R.2d 1079.
Liability for damages in tort of state or governmental unit in operating hospital, 25 A.L.R.2d 203, 18 A.L.R.4th 858.
Insurance: liability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as affecting immunity from tort liability, 68 A.L.R.2d 1437.
Right of one governmental subdivision to sue another such subdivision for damages, 11 A.L.R.5th 630.
20 C.J.S. Counties § 254.