As used in this article, the term “nonresident” includes an individual, or a partnership, association, or other legal or commercial entity (other than a corporation) not residing, domiciled, organized, or existing in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises, or a corporation which is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises. The term “nonresident” shall also include an individual, or a partnership, association, or other legal or commercial entity (other than a corporation) who, at the time a claim or cause of action arises under Code Section 9-10-91, was residing, domiciled, organized, or existing in this state and subsequently becomes a resident, domiciled, organized, or existing outside of this state as of the date of perfection of service of process as provided by Code Section 9-10-94.
History. Ga. L. 1968, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1977, p. 586, § 1.
Law reviews.
For article summarizing law relating to jurisdiction and venue over domestic and foreign corporations in Georgia, and service therein, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1970).
For article, “Foreign Corporations in Georgia,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973).
For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia’s long arm statute, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977).
For article examining waiver of objections to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction by default, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 181 (1978).
For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978).
For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980).
For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982).
For article, “Georgia’s Unconstitutional Business Venue Provision: A Kingdom with Impermissible Borders,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2018).
For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972).
For note advocating the adoption of a statute incorporating the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 744 (1973).
For note analyzing the long arm statute and suggesting some reforms, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976).
For note, “Getting Personal With Our Neighbors — A Survey of Southern States’ Exercise of General Jurisdiction and A Proposal for Extending Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute,” see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1177 (2009).
For comment on Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 414 (1972).
For comment on Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58 , 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1973).
For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 , 62 L. Ed. 2 d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591 , 62 L. Ed. 2 d 516 (1980), regarding minimum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980).
For comment, “Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982).