As used in this chapter, the term:
The contents of the statement shall be considered but shall not alone be sufficient to establish the declarant’s authority under subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, the agency or employment relationship and scope thereof under subparagraph (D) of this paragraph, or the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered under subparagraph (E) of this paragraph.
History. Code 1981, § 24-8-801 , enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.
Cross references.
Failure to deny averments in pleading as constituting admission, § 9-11-8(d) .
Definitions that apply to this article; exclusions from hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 801.
Law reviews.
For article discussing exceptions to the hearsay rule and advocating elimination of the res gestae exception, see 5 Mercer L. Rev. 257 (1954).
For article, “Evidence from Computers,” see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 562 (1974).
For article, “An Analysis of Georgia’s Proposed Rules of Evidence,” see 26 Ga. St. B.J. 173 (1990).
For article, “The New ‘Necessity Exception’ to the Hearsay Rule in Georgia: A New Rule of Inclusion?,” see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 573 (2000).
For article, “Evidence,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 281 (2001).
For article, “Wills, Trusts & Administration of Estates,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 499 (2001).
For annual survey on evidence, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 125 (2013).
For annual survey on criminal law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2018).
For article, “Parallel Proceedings,” see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 20 (Feb. 2020).
For note, “Lilly v. Virginia: Answering the Williamson Question — Is the Statement Against Penal Interest Exception ‘Firmly Rooted’ Under Confrontation Clause Analysis?,” see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 1343 (2000).
For comment on Brewer v. Henson, 96 Ga. App. 501 , 100 S.E.2d 661 (1957), holding that statements made by patient to physician which are not equivalent to spontaneous and voluntary expressions of present pain and suffering are not admissible as evidence, see 21 Ga. B.J. 97 (1958).
For comment on Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., 105 Ga. App. 70 , 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961), see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 445 (1963).
For comment as to admissibility of evidence of a criminal conviction in a civil action arising out of the same factual situation, in light of Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965), see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 464 (1965).
For comment on Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210 , 27 L. Ed. 2 d 213 (1970), and Georgia’s coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 791 (1971).
For comment on Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 741 , 182 S.E.2d 508 (1971), upholding admission of psychiatric opinion based on subjective declarations of patient, see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 554 (1972).
For comment, “24-3-2: Evidence to Explain Conduct and Ascertain Motive Gets Disciplined,” see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 733 (1985).