Georgia Code
Article 1 - Procedure for Sentencing and Imposition of Punishment
§ 17-10-1. Fixing of Sentence; Suspension or Probation of Sentence; Change in Sentence; Eligibility for Parole; Prohibited Modifications; Exceptions

(A) “Developmental disability” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 37-1-1.
(B) “Indigent” means an individual who earns less than 100 percent of the federal poverty guidelines unless there is evidence that the individual has other resources that might reasonably be used without undue hardship for such individual or his or her dependents.
History. Ga. L. 1919, p. 387, § 1; Code 1933, § 27-2502; Ga. L. 1950, p. 352, § 3; Ga. L. 1964, p. 483, §§ 2, 4; Ga. L. 1974, p. 352, §§ 3, 4; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1024, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 17; Ga. L. 1984, p. 894, § 2; Ga. L. 1986, p. 842, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 463, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 310, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 3221, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 9; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1043, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1257, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 842, § 6; Ga. L. 2000, p. 20, § 7; Ga. L. 2001, p. 94, § 5; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1030, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 775, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 17/HB 95; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 19/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2006, p. 710, § 7/SB 203; Ga. L. 2010, p. 230, § 10/HB 1015; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 4-3/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 17/HB 79; Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 7/HB 349; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-17/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 17/HB 90; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-30/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 13-4/SB 367; Ga. L. 2017, p. 585, § 2-1/SB 174; Ga. L. 2018, p. 550, § 2-6/SB 407; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 17/SB 365; Ga. L. 2020, p. 361, § 1/HB 984; Ga. L. 2021, p. 223, § 1/SB 105.
The 2018 amendments. —
The first 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, substituted “with no prior felony conviction is convicted of felony offenses or is charged with felony offenses and is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2 or Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, and the court imposes a sentence of probation or not more than 12 months of imprisonment followed by a term of probation,” for “is convicted of felony offenses, has no prior felony conviction, and the court imposes a sentence of probation, not to include a split sentence,” in the first sentence of subparagraph (a)(1)(B); substituted the present provisions of paragraph (a)(2) for the former provisions, which read: “Active probation supervision shall terminate in all cases no later than two years from the commencement of active probation supervision unless specially extended or reinstated by the sentencing court upon notice and hearing and for good cause shown; provided, however, that in those cases involving the collection of restitution, the period of active probation supervision shall remain in effect for so long as any such obligation is outstanding, or until termination of the sentence, whichever first occurs, and for those cases involving a conviction under Chapter 15 of Title 16, the ‘Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act,’ the period of active probation supervision shall remain in effect until the termination of the sentence, but shall not exceed five years unless as otherwise provided in this paragraph. Supervision shall not be required for defendants sentenced to probation while the defendant is in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections or the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.”; and substituted the present provisions of subsection (d), for the former provisions, which read: “In any case involving a misdemeanor or a felony in which the defendant has been punished in whole or in part by a fine, the sentencing judge shall be authorized to allow the defendant to satisfy such fine through community service as defined in Code Section 42-3-50. One hour of community service shall equal the dollar amount of one hour of paid labor at the minimum wage under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, in effect on January 1, 2017, unless otherwise specified by the sentencing judge. A defendant shall be required to serve the number of hours in community service which equals the number derived by dividing the amount of the fine by the federal minimum hourly wage or by the amount specified by the sentencing judge. Prior to or subsequent to sentencing, a defendant, or subsequent to sentencing, a community supervision officer, may request that the court make all or any portion of a fine be satisfied under this subsection.” The second 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, inserted “or she” near the beginning of the second sentence of subsection (b).
The 2020 amendment, effective January 1, 2021, added the second sentence in subsection (f).
The 2021 amendment, effective May 3, 2021, rewrote subparagraph (a)(1)(B) and added the third sentence in subparagraph (a)(5)(A).
Cross references.
Diploma requirement as condition of probation in juvenile proceeding, § 15-11-601 .
Discretion of judge to allow conditional discharge for first offenders of laws relating to possession of controlled substances or dangerous drugs, § 16-13-2 .
Sentence to imprisonment for life without parole authorized, § 17-10-16 .
Notification required to be given to commissioner of offender rehabilitation following imposition of sentence, and as to assignment of convicted person to correctional institution, § 42-5-50 .
Alternative provisions for sentencing of offenders between ages 17 and 25, § 42-7-3 et seq.
Procedure for hearing and determining question of probation generally, § 42-8-34 .
Probation of first offenders, § 42-8-60 .
Editor’s notes.
Ga. L. 1991, p. 310, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 1991 amendments to this Code section, effective July 1, 1991, are applicable to sentences of probation entered prior to, on, or after July 1, 1991.
Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, and effective May 1, 1993, provides: “Except as provided in this section, the provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed after the effective date of this Act. With express written consent of the state, a defendant whose offense was committed prior to the effective date of this Act may elect in writing to be sentenced under the provisions of this Act provided that: (1) jeopardy for the offense charged has not attached and the state has filed with the trial court notice of its intention to seek the death penalty or (2) the defendant has been sentenced to death but the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal and the state is not barred from seeking the death penalty after remand.”
Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, and effective May 1, 1993, provides: “Except as provided in Section 6 of this Act [Code Section 17-10-32.1], the amendment or repeal of a Code section by this Act shall not affect any sentence imposed by any court of this state prior to the effective date of this Act nor shall this Act be construed as repealing Code Sections 17-10-30, 17-10-31, or 17-10-32 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.”
Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 9, not codified by the General Assembly, and effective May 1, 1993, provides: “No person shall be sentenced to life without parole unless such person could have received the death penalty under the laws of this state as such laws have been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia.”
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994.’ ”
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly declares and finds:
“(1) That persons who are convicted of certain serious violent felonies shall serve minimum terms of imprisonment which shall not be suspended, probated, stayed, deferred, or otherwise withheld by the sentencing judge; and
“(2) That sentences ordered by courts in cases of certain serious violent felonies shall be served in their entirety and shall not be reduced by parole or by any earned time, early release, work release, or other such sentence-reducing measures administered by the Department of Corrections.”
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed on or after the effective date of this Act; provided, however, that any conviction occurring prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act shall be deemed a ‘conviction’ for the purposes of this Act and shall be counted in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act.” This Act became effective January 1, 1995.
Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly declares and finds: (1) That the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994,’ approved April 20, 1994 (Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959), provided that persons convicted of one of seven serious violent felonies shall serve minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment which shall not otherwise be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; (2) That in , 225 Ga. App. 509 (1997), the Georgia Court of Appeals held, notwithstanding the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994,’ that the provisions of the First Offender Act would still be available to the sentencing court, which would mean that a person who committed a serious violent felony could be sentenced to less than the minimum mandatory ten-year sentence; and (3) That, contrary to the decision in State v. Allmond , it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that persons who commit a serious violent felony specified in the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994’ shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment.”
Ga. L. 2001, p. 94, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘2001 Crime Prevention Act.’ ”
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:
“(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;
“(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;
“(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;
“(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;
“(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and
“(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.
“The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender’s presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender.”
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.”
Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act.”
Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 21/HB 349, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2013, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense.”
Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions.”
Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 54(e)/HB 90, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “In the event of a conflict between a provision in Sections 1 through 53 of this Act and a provision of another Act enacted at the 2015 regular session of the General Assembly, the provision of such other Act shall control over the conflicting provision in Sections 1 through 53 of this Act to the extent of the conflict.” Accordingly, the amendment to subsection (d) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 17/HB 90, was not given effect.
Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.
Law reviews.
For article discussing the constitutionality of imposing harsher sentences upon defendants found guilty in new trial after appeal, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 183 (1969).
For annual survey of criminal law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 83 (2006).
For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 11, 61 (2006).
For survey article on criminal law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (2007).
For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 290 (2012).
For article, “Appeal and Error: Appeal or Certiorari by State in Criminal Cases,” see 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 17 (2013).
For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).
For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U. L. Rev. 139 (2016).
For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 115 (2017).
For article on the 2018 amendment of this Code section, see 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 45 (2018).
For annual survey on criminal law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 63 (2018).
For article, “SB 174: Revising Georgia’s List of Bail Restricted Offenses,” see 38 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 41 (2021).
For article with annual survey on criminal law, see 73 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (2021).
For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 183 (1993).
For note on the 2001 amendment of this Code section, see 18 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 47 (2001).
For note, “ ‘158-County Banishment’ in Georgia: Constitutional Implications under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1083 (2002).
For note, “Blakely v. Washington: Criminal Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment Limitation on Judicial Factfinding,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1079 (2005).
For note, “Give It to Me, I’m Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia’s Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).
For comment on State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), as to an indigent misdemeanant’s right to counsel, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 440 (1968).

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