(a) There shall be no limitation of time within which a person may be prosecuted for (1) (A) a capital felony under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d or 53a-169, or (B) any other offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault if the victim of the offense was a minor at the time of the offense, including, but not limited to, a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21, (2) a violation of section 53a-165aa or 53a-166 in which such person renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed an offense set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection, (3) a violation of section 53a-156 committed during a proceeding that results in the conviction of another person subsequently determined to be actually innocent of the offense or offenses of which such other person was convicted, or (4) a motor vehicle violation or offense that resulted in the death of another person and involved a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-224.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section or subdivision (2) of this subsection, no person may be prosecuted for a violation of a (A) class B felony violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a or 53a-70b, (B) class C felony violation of section 53a-71 or 53a-72b, or (C) class D felony violation of section 53a-72a, except within twenty years next after the offense has been committed.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, no person may be prosecuted for any offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a victim if the victim was eighteen, nineteen or twenty years of age at the time of the offense, except not later than thirty years next after such victim attains the age of twenty-one years.
(3) No person may be prosecuted for a class A misdemeanor violation of section 53a-73a if the victim at the time of the offense was twenty-one years of age or older, except within ten years next after the offense has been committed.
(c) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed.
(d) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, except within one year next after the offense has been committed.
(e) If the person against whom an indictment, information or complaint for any of said offenses is brought has fled from and resided out of this state during the period so limited, it may be brought against such person at any time within such period, during which such person resides in this state, after the commission of the offense.
(f) When any suit, indictment, information or complaint for any crime may be brought within any other time than is limited by this section, it shall be brought within such time.
(1949 Rev., S. 8871; P.A. 76-35, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-604, S. 40, 84; P.A. 80-313, S. 53; P.A. 86-197; P.A. 00-87, S. 1, 2; P.A. 10-180, S. 6; P.A. 12-5, S. 36; P.A. 14-185, S. 1; P.A. 19-16, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 76-35 replaced reference to crimes and misdemeanors, treason, etc. with general reference to offenses, adding exceptions re capital felonies and class A felonies, deleted specific reference to imprisonment in Somers facility, substituting applicability based on imprisonment for more than one year, and specified that there is no limitation for prosecution of capital and class A felonies; P.A. 77-604 made no change; P.A. 80-313 reordered and rephrased provisions, dividing section into Subsecs.; P.A. 86-197 provided that there shall be no time limitation on the prosecution of a person for a violation of Sec. 53a-54d; P.A. 00-87 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to provide that there shall be no time limitation on the prosecution of a person for a violation of Sec. 53a-169 and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in Subsec. (c), effective May 26, 2000, and applicable to any offense committed prior to, on or after said date; P.A. 10-180 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing offenses for which there is no time limitation as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re violation of Sec. 53a-165aa or 53a-166 and add Subdiv. (3) re violation of Sec. 53a-156, amended Subsec. (b) to replace “except a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d or 53a-169” with “other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) of this section”, designated existing provision re offenses subject to one-year time limitation as Subsec. (c) and amended same to replace “any other offense, except a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d or 53a-169” with “any offense, other than an offense set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section” and redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) and (d) as Subsecs. (d) and (e), effective June 8, 2010, and applicable to any offense committed on or after that date and to any offense committed prior to that date for which the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the commission of the offense had not yet expired as of that date; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 14-185 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (4) re motor vehicle violation or offense that resulted in death of another and involved a violation of Sec. 14-224(a); P.A. 19-16 amended Subsec. (a) by redesignating Subdiv. (1) re capital felony as Subdiv. (1)(A) and adding Subpara. (B) re sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of minor, added new Subsec. (b) re certain sexual assault offenses, redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) to (e) as Subsecs. (c) to (f) and made conforming changes, effective October 1, 2019, and applicable to any offense committed on or after October 1, 2019, and to any offense committed prior to October 1, 2019, for which the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the commission of the offense had not yet expired as of October 1, 2019.
Qui tam information amendable, notwithstanding no new information for same cause could be brought. 10 C. 472. Grand juror's complaint and information of state's attorney part of same proceeding and prevents running of statute. 49 C. 437. Statute does not run as to conspiracy until last overt act is committed. 126 C. 85. Cited. 150 C. 229; 163 C. 230. Prosecution within 1 year for first offender. Id., 234. P.A. 76-35, which amended statute to remove the 5-year limitation on prosecutions for capital or class A felonies, was not applied retroactively to crimes committed while 5-year limitation was in effect in absence of language clearly necessitating such construction. 189 C. 346. Cited. 197 C. 436; Id., 507. Protection afforded by statute may be waived; treated as an affirmative defense, not as jurisdictional. 199 C. 631. Prosecution for violation of Sec. 53a-54(a)(1) not barred by this section. 201 C. 435. Cited. 204 C. 98; 213 C. 388; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145; 242 C. 409. Amendment to statute of limitations applies retroactively to crimes committed before its effective date but for which the preamendment limitation period had not yet expired. 276 C. 633. Plainly and unambiguously provides that statute of limitations runs from the date of the offense. 301 C. 630. Subsec. (c) tolls the limitation period solely with respect to the time within which a prosecution may be brought and does not purport to address prosecutions that have already been brought, at which point there is no need for tolling because the statute of limitations has already been satisfied. 341 C. 47.
Cited. 28 CA 91; 34 CA 473; 35 CA 754; 41 CA 476. Subsec. (d) extends the time within which an indictment, information or complaint may be brought, but it does not extend the time in which a warrant can be served. 190 CA 817.
It is not necessary in criminal prosecution to prove the precise day the acts were committed. 4 CS 259. Cited. 6 CS 349; 24 CS 312. After a nolle prosequi has been entered, statute of limitations continues to run and a prosecution may be resumed only on a new information and a new arrest. 32 CS 504. Cited. 35 CS 565. Issuance of arrest warrant starts prosecution and tolls statute of limitations. 38 CS 377. The prosecution of defendant began with his arrest; once prosecution has commenced within time period allowed by appropriate statute of limitations, the prosecutor has broad discretion as to what crimes to charge in any particular situation. 39 CS 347.
Former Subsec. (b):
Cited. 202 C. 86; Id., 93. Issuance of arrest warrant is sufficient initiation of a prosecution to toll statute of limitations if warrant served with due diligence. Id., 443. Cited. 209 C. 52; 211 C. 441; 228 C. 393. Although the case against defendant under Sec. 20-427 was initially dismissed based on statute of limitations, state's successful appeal on statute of limitations calculation and subsequent trial did not constitute unlawful double jeopardy. 250 C. 1. When the state files an amended or substitute information after the limitations period has passed, a timely information will toll statute of limitations only if the amended or substitute information does not broaden or substantially amend the charges made in the timely information. 305 C. 330. Once a defendant has demonstrated his nonelusiveness and availability for arrest during the statutory period, the state must demonstrate the reasonableness of any delay between the issuance and service of an arrest warrant, at least when service occurs after the expiration of the limitation period. 325 C. 793.
Cited. 15 CA 222; 21 CA 449; 26 CA 674; 42 CA 790. Pursuant to Subsec., charged violations of Sec. 14-227a were subject to a 1-year limitations period because they were not punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year; trial court did not improperly deny defendant's motion to dismiss counts of information on grounds that statute of limitations precluded prosecution of counts where court found no evidence that defendant raised statute of limitations as an affirmative defense at trial. 61 CA 90. Prosecution was time barred where the police department did not make sufficient effort to ensure that warrant was timely served and therefore the state could not demonstrate that delay of nearly 3 years on service of arrest warrant was reasonable to toll statute of limitations. 130 CA 734.
Former Subsec. (d):
Re meaning of “fled” in former Subsec. (c), plain language does not require defendant to leave the state with intent to avoid prosecution, and Subsec. may toll statute of limitations when defendant absents himself from the jurisdiction with reason to believe that an investigation may ensue as a result of his actions. 306 C. 698.